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THE TRAUMATIC DIMENSION IN LAW
David Gray Carlson*

Legal knowledge can only be expressed in the future anterior tense.
This concept is familiar enough to lawyers when the circuits are badly
split and the Supreme Court seeks to cure the split by granting
certiorari Under these conditions, no one is sure what the law is today,
but later, when the Supreme Court resolves the split, we will have
known what the law was all along.
.
This undeniable legal experience of the future anterior tense is n
the exception—it is the very condition of possibi ity f®'" all ^
reasoning. Law is not sometimes, but always, spoken m the fotu
anterior tense. The split in the circuits is always already resolved by
an antecedent law whose revelation is always deferred.
• r-^
The purpose of this essay is to describe legal reasoning m futare
anterior terms. In this account, future anteriority is the point at which
legal reasoning coincides with the judicial opinion. This is the very
point where we can find that law does determine the outcome of
htigahon^^
opinion, whether by judge or lawyer, is what
psychoanalysis refers to as an "act." The act, it seems, is always
beyond the law. Paradoxically, law makes its appearance only throng
the medium of the act. Only when the judge exceeds the law and
disrupts it by acting will we know what the law is.
„
In psychoanalysis, with its emphasis on unconscious motivation,
an act precedes its reason-the effect precedes its cause. Only m afterthe-f(act) narration—i.e., the written opinion of the judge-^oes reason
nrecede the act. Nevertheless, the act is a "real event. It is presymbolic and, for that very reason, open to a posteriori narration, m
which the judge claims that the act was "caused" by law.
Acts are "traumatic." A trauma is a "residual experience that has

* Professor of Law, Betrjamin N. Cardozo School f Law Yeshiva Lniversi^

toZ Washington University School of Law and the University of Miami School of Law.

Jo

2288

CARDOZO LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 24:6

become a stumbling block to the patient."^ It is "that which interrupts
the smooth functioning of law and the automatic unfolding of the
signifying chain."^ It is "the rupture in the symbolic narrative
continuum."^ It is "the object that cannot be swallowed, as it were,
which remains stuck in the gullet of the signifier."^ It disrupts and
continues to disrupt, until it is gentrified into the symbolic order. This
gentrification is what psychoanalysis refers to as "cure" and what
lawyers call legal reasoning.
In law, every judicial decision is traumatic. A posteriori legal
reasoning is the cure. It gentrifies the trauma by providing causal
narrative after the fact for the judge's fundamentally spontaneous, free
act. But from the premise that acts are always pre-rational the reader
should not think that she is in for yet another rehearsal of bad legal
realism, according to which will displaces law, and words mean
whatever the judge wants them to mean. Legal realism holds that cases
are decided pathologically—^by what the judge had for breakfast. Legal
reasoning is portrayed as just a mask for power. Law is reduced to mere
politics.
This "Foucaultian" position^ is precisely the opposite of what
psychoanalysis makes of legal reasoning. Lacanian theory^ explains
legal reasoning's true and vital role in legal (and other) decisionmaking.
The point here is absolutely not that legal decisionmaking is just
politics. Judicial decisionmaking could not escape legality even if it
made a concerted effort to do so. To turn the tables on Critical Legal
Studies, politics is always a continuation of law by other means.'' Only
in romantic jurisprudence (of which the legal academic left is usually
guilty) can we dispense with reasoned law.^ The point of this essay,
then, is to vindicate not just the possibility but the very necessity of
good old-fashioned legal reasoning.
Its intent is therefore
fundamentally conservative. But, unlike other conservative accounts,
which fear and therefore deny the Freudian unconscious, this account
1 BRUCE FINK, THE LACANIAN SUBJECT: BETWEEN LANGUAGE AND JOUISSANCE 26
(1995).
2 Id. at 83.

3 SLAVOJZIZEK, ON BELIEF 101 (2001).
4 JACQUES LACAN, THE FOUR FUNDAMENTAL CONCEPTS OF PSYCHO-ANALYSIS 270
(Jacques-Alain Miller ed., Alan Sheridan trans., 1977).
3 On the Foucaultian, or "historicist," position, see JOAN COPJEC, READ MY DESIRE: LACAN
AGAINST THE HISTORICISTS 1-14 (1994) [hereinafter CoPJEC, READ MY DESIRE].
^ For a biographical sketch of Jacques Marie Emile Lacan, see YANNIS STAVRAKAKIS,
LACAN AND THE POLITICAL 10-12 (1999).
2 Cf. Pierre Schlag, Law as the Continuation of God by Other Means, 85 CAL. L. REV. 427

(1997).
® On the covert tendency for romanticism in leftist American scholarship, see David Gray
Carlson, Review Essay, Duellism in Modern American Jurisprudence, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1908
(1999); Jeanne L. Schroeder, Pandora's Amphora: The Ambiguity of Gifts, 46 UCLA L. REV. 815
(1999).
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embraces it as the very place where a judicial act coincides with the
legal reasoning that caused it. In this vision, the subject is not pre-legal,
as policy scientists hope. Nor is the subject entirely the product of the
legal regime, as the Foucaultians would have it. Rather, the subject s
existence is in the future anterior tense. It is what it will have done. Its
presence is always a deferral.
This Article exploits the psychoanalytic insight that all acts are
traumatic (including the act of forming a legal opinion). In the act is the
past, future, and present of the relation between law and outcome. First,
law is in the past. In the judge's account of her opinion, the judge read
the law and then followed it, producing the judicial outcome. Second,
law comes too late; it is always deferred into the future. Legal
reasoning is epiphenomenal to the act, and legal reasoning is
epiphenomenal to the judicial decision. The act causes reason, and not
reason the act. This is not just occasionally so. It is always so, on the
view that the free act is spontaneous and uncaused.^ Third, and most
important for our present purpose, law is present—i.e., coterminous
with the judicial outcome. Given that acts are spontaneous {i.e.,
uncaused), we can see infinite causes of an act and hence never all of
them. Acts are always over-determined."' This opacity of the agent s
motivation—our inability to fathom our own motives is precisely
what it means for human beings to be free (i.e., not "caused")." We are
accorded the privilege of assigning meaning to our own acts (selected
from an infinite set of possible causes).It is paradoxically this very
over-determination (or freedom from reason) that permits the possibility
that post hoc justification accurately describes the judicial decision. In
the end, our freedom from reason underwrites the possibility of our free
submission to reason. This third point therefore establishes the
possibility that legal reasoning is the noble enterprise the pre-realists
thought it was.
I begin with some psychoanalytic information about the subject
and her act. Thereafter, I discuss the Freudian superego and its impact

9 "Spontaneity" is a Kantian term associated with freedom vs. self-causation.

See

IMMANUEL KANT, CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON 33 (J.M.D. Meiklejohn trans., 1990) (liberty is
absolute spontaneity, an unconditioned as first member of a causal series) [hereinafter CRITIQUE
QF PURE REASON].
„
10 See IMMANUEL KANT, RELIGION WITHIN THE BOUNDARIES OF MERE REASON AND
OTHER WRITINGS 121 (Allen Wood & George di Giovanni trans., 1998) [hereinafter KANT,
RELIGION].

11 See SLAvol ZIZEK, DID SOMEBODY SAY TOTALITARIANISM? FIVE INTERVENTIONS IN THE
(MIS)USE OF A NOTION 58 (2001) ("Freedom is ultimately nothing but the space opened up by the
encounter,
the
space
to
be filled
in
by
its contingent/inadequate
traumatic
symbolizations/translations") [hereinafter ZIZEK, TOTALITARIANISM].

12 G.W.F. HEGEL, ELEMENTS OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT § 114 Addition (Allen w.
Wood ed., H.B. Nisbe't trans., 1991) ("it is the right of the moral will to recognize .. . only what
was inwardly present as purpose") [hereinafter HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT].
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on interpretation. I will make the surprising claim that the superego
coincides precisely with the legal regime in which law precedes the
act—the regime where "right" legal answers are possible. The "right"
legal answer is "Guilty!"
Legal reasoning will then be described as narration in response to
the trauma of legal decisionmaking. Various asides will be made at the
expense of H.L.A. Hart and of what falsely passes as philosophy under
the name of "pragmatism." Finally, the future anterior quality of law
will be used to describe the content of that elusive concept—justice.
The point of this essay is to account for the possibility of legal
reasoning. Its intent is therefore fundamentally conservative and
vindicative of the traditional legal enterprise. But, unlike other
accounts, which deny the Freudian unconscious, this account embraces
the unconscious and makes it the very place where a judicial act
coincides with the legal reasoning that caused it. In this vision, the
subject is not pre-legal, as the social policy scientists hope. Nor is the
subject entirely the product of the legal regime, as the Foucaultians
would have it. Rather, the subject is in the future anterior tense. It is
what it will have done. Its presence is always a deferral. In short, the
subject is the law, and the law is our freedom.
THE SUBJECT

What is the operative psychological theory in the ordinary science
of legal scholarship, whether it be utilitarian, communitarian or
libertarian in its outlook? It is undoubtedly this: law is "positive"—a
fiction imposed by human beings on other human beings—^but the
subject is "natural."'^ The subject is self-identical, self-present, and,
above all, rational. This rational subject knows himself completely. In
Lacanian terms, this subject "has the phallus."'^
There is no
unconscious in this self-present entity. In effect, the subject coincides
with the ego.'^
Psychoanalysis disagrees with this presupposition of self-identity
13 STAVRAKAKIS, supra note 6, at 17. There is of course a natural law tradition but, of late,
overt naturalism is scandalous and has become a priori grounds to disqualify its practitioners
from nomination to the Supreme Court. See Lawrence Tribe, The Case Judge Thomas Shouldn't
Have Heard: Natural Law, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 30, 1991. Paradoxically, natural psychology is
accepted as a matter of course by run-of-the-mill legal scholarship, even while natural law is
scorned as naive.
14 See JEANNE LORRAINE SCHROEDER, THE VESTAL AND THE FASCES: HEGEL, LAGAN,
PROPERTY, AND THE FEMININE 87-94 (1998). The masculine position of having implies a
complete self-identity and a denial of castration. The feminine position, in contrast, is being.
Woman is the phallus. See id. at 89.
13 See generally David Gray Carlson, Jurisprudence and Personality in the Work of John
Rawls, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1828 (1994).
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and the implicit renunciation of the unconscious. In the Lacanian
tradition, the subject is not self-identical. Indeed, [t]he subject who
coincides entirely with herself is not yet a subject, and once she
becomes a subject she no longer coincides with herself. ...
Unlike the self-identical subject of utilitarianism and other forms
of "common sense,"'^ the psychoanalytic subject is split between the
Symbolic and the Real. It participates in the symbolic order. This is the
public realm of language, law and ethics. The Symbolic is the realm of
positive being—of concepts and thought. This is where the Ego thinks
it resides in its self-identity.
Lacanians deny that the symbolic "I" is the subject.'^ Rather, the
subject is constituted by a negative something that language, reason and
law never can describe. Lacan called this negativity the Real
the
unfathomable limit that prevents the Particular from achieving identity
with itself."'^ As limit, the Real is not beyond the Symbolic realm, for
there is no such beyond.^" The Real inheres within the realm of the
symbolic.2i jhe Real stands for the inability of the Symbolic realm to
be fully present. It stands against the presupposition that any objectincluding the subject—can be self-identical.When limit is imagined
to be utterly external to a concept, we have the presupposition of selfidentity, not to mention the Kantian presupposition of a beyond
impervious to thought. For the Lacanians, the subject is the limit and
16 ALENKA ZUPANCIC, ETHICS OF THE REAL: KANT, LAGAN 143 (2000).
11 For the view that utilitarian psychology is normative and aspirational rather than
descriptive, see COPJEC, READ MY DESIRE, supra note 5, at 65-116.
18 For this reason, Lacanians insists that "[t]he '1' is not the subject." Mladen Dolar, Cogito
as the Subject of the Unconscious, in SIC 2; COGITO AND THE UNCONSCIOUS 12 (Slavoj ZIZEK
ed., 1998).

19 SLAVOJ ZI2EK, FOR THEY KNOW NOT WHAT THEY DO: ENJOYMENT AS A POLITICAL
FACTOR 105 (2d ed. 2002) [hereinafer ZL2EK, ENJOYMENT AS A POLITICAL FACTOR].
20 That there is no beyond—(i.e., that it is appearance all the way down) ends up being the
very punchline of Hegel's entire philosophy. As Hegel remarks in the Phenomenology, "behind
the so-called curtain which is supposed to conceal the inner world, there is nothing to be seen
unless we go behind it ourselves, as much in order that we may see, as that there may be
something behind there which can be seen." G.W.F. HEGEL, PHENOMENOLOGY OF SPIRIT § 165
(A V Miller trans., 1977) [hereinafter PHENOMENOLOGY OF SPIRIT]. See ROBERT B. PIPPIN,
HEGEL'S IDEALISM: THE SATISFACTIONS OF SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS 206 (1989) ("the major point
... is to argue that there is literally nothing 'beyond' or 'behind' or responsible for the human
experience of the world of appearances, and certainly not an Absolute Spirit."); KENNETH R.
WESTPHAL, HEGEL'S EPISTELOGICAL REALISM: A STUDY OF THE AIM AND METHOD OF
HEGEL'S PHENOMENOLOGY OF SPIRIT 165 (1989) ("if Hegel's arguments in the consciousness
section [of the Phenomenology] are successful, then the world has been found to be cognitively
accessible; there isn't anything more to the world than what it manifests. ).
21 See Jeanne L. Schroeder, The End of the Market: A Psychoanalysis of Law and Economics,

112 HARV. L. REV. 483, 500 (1998).

22 Hegel emphasizes that limit always inheres within—not outside of—finite concepts. See

HEGEL'S SCIENCE OF LOGIC 117 (A.v. Miller trans., 1969) ("This limit is . . . the immanent
determination of the something itself, which latter is thus the finite. ) [hereinafter SCIENCE OF
LOGIC]. On Hegel's theory of limit, see David Gray Carlson, Hegel's Theory of Quality, 22
CARDOZO L. REV. 425, 520-23 (2001).
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not constituted within or inside of a limit.
The real is connected with jouissance—the momentary sense a
subjeet feels in complete, triumphant self-identity. In jouissance, all
alienation and pain ends. ''Jouissance is proof of the subject's
existence,"23 but it is also lethal. If the subject is the split between the
symbolic and the real, the surrender of the Symbolic is the death of the
subject—^pure psychosis.
Because the real is the negation of the symbolic, it is preontologicap4 and pre-historical.25 Although the Lacanians tell a certain
noospheric story about the emergence of the subject from nature,^^ it
must be strictly understood that the symbolic and real do not antedate
the subject. The symbolic and the real are equiprimordial—they come
into existence only simultaneously with the subject. This must be so, as
the subjeet is simply the split between the symbolic and the real.
The subject always faces the risk of slipping away from the
symbolic into the real. A final merger with the Real is "ceasing-tobe"—negative becoming, or psychosis. The subject resists this descent
into darkness by striving to recognize itself symbolically.
To
distinguish itself and thereby to stave off death, the subject must body
forth and find its shape in the symbolic. There the subject finds the
public materials out of which it can build a "fantasy"—^the narrative in
which the subjeet has positive existence to others. The Imaginary is
thus the third great realm in Lacan's empire, alongside the Real and the
Symbolic. In the Imaginary, the subject constructs a story in which he
is whole and integral. It is for this reason that fantasy is on the side of
"reality" and against the real.^? "[WJhen the phantasmic frame
disintegrates," Slavoj Zizek warns, "the subject undergoes a 'loss of
reality' and starts to perceive reality as an 'unreal' nightmarish universe
with no firm ontological foundation."2^ This loss of fantasy is
psychosis.29
Language and law provide a refuge against psychosis. Yet the
materials found there are never adequate to the subject. If I am purely
23 ZUPANCiC, supra note 16, at 30.

24 See SLAVOJ ZIZEK, THE TICKL'SH SUBJECT: THE ABSENT CENTRE OF POLITICAL
ONTOLOGY 33, 42, 63, 65 (1999) [hereinafter ZLZEK, TICKLISH SUBJECT],
25 See DANIEL BERTHOLD-BOND, HEGEL'S THEORY OF MADNESS 29 (1995).
26 See generally SLAVOJ ZlZEK, THE ABYSS OF FREEDOM / AGES OF THE WORLD (1997)
[hereinafter ZlZEK, ABYSS OF FREEDOM],
27 See SLAVOJ ZIZEK, THE SUBLIME OBJECT OF IDEOLOGY 43 (1989) [hereinafter ZI2EK,

SUBLIME OBJECT],
28 ZIZEK, TICKLISH SUBJECT, supra note 24, at 51. See ZIZEK, SUBLIME OBJECT supra note

27, at 35 (suggesting that fantasy is the soul of paranoia),
29 See FINK, supra note 1, at 45-46, According to Daniel Berthold-Bond, "the mad self does
not seek td destroy its own desire, but to emancipate its desire from any pretense of finding unity
with what lies outside it." BERTHOLD-BOND, supra note 25, at 82. In other words, madness is a
defense against painful encounters with the symbolic realm, which only the Imaginary can
mediate.
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symbolic, I have no individuality whatever. Rather, I reduce myself to
the point where I am just an object to others. Too much objectification
is a bad thing—the indicium of hysteria.^o it is pornography as such.
Hence, if I am to maintain my existence as a private individual, I must
keep my distance from the symbolic. I cannot reveal all. Whatever
words I use to describe myself, I somehow always leave something
out.3i If I show too much, I become the mere object to X\iQjouissance of
others.^2

But neither must I do the opposite. I must not merge with the Real
(the incest taboo). This is a retreat into psychosis. In the Real I am not
merely unfree. I am dead.
As I am literally the gap between the Symbolic (where the subject
finds a positive existence) and the Real (which is beyond languageV^ I
cannot surrender to either extreme. If this gap closes (in favor of either
realm), I no longer exist as a subject.
Yet, if I am a gap, I am a void—a nothing. I desire to "be," but I am
not. To be fully something, a supplement is needed. This feeling
that something is missing is the above-mentioned castration.^"*
As a subject, I desire to close the gap by manucaption of my
missing parts. Only in the resurrection of the body can I be whole. But
if I succeed—if I establish a self-identity free and clear of the symbolic

30 See SLAVOJ ZIZEK, THE INDIVISIBLE REMAINDER; AN ESSAY ON SCHELLING AND

RELATED MATTERS 164 (1996) [hereinafter ZIZEK, INDIVISIBLE REMAINDER]; SLAVOJ ZIZEK,
LOOKING AWRY: AN INTRODUCTION TO JACQUES LACAN THROUGH POPULAR CULTURE 131
(1991) [hereinafter ZIZEK, LOOKING AWRY],
.
•

31 Woman, for the Lacanians, is the "not-all" who does not submit to the phallic function ot
complete knowledge. According to Collette Soler, "Man is the subject entirely submitted to the
phallic function, from which it follows that castration is his lot
Woman is the opposite, the
Other who has not fully [pas tout] submitted to the reign of phallic puissance. . .
Collette
Soler, The Curse on Sex, in SEXUATION SiC 3 41 (Renata Salecl ed., 2000).
32 This is, 1 think at the heart of feminist opposition to pomography. See COPJEC, READ MY
DESIRE, supra note 5, at 35. Zizek insinuates that the superego is pomographic, since it sees all.
See SLAVOJ ZIZEK, THE PLAGUE OF FANTASIES 177-92 (1997) [hereinafter ZLZEK, PLAGUE OF
FANTASIES] Our individuality, then, depends upon our refusal to give into this obscene demand
to surrender our opacity. See id. at 114. More precisely, what we are ashamed to reveal are our
fantasies, in which we see ourselves uncastrated. ZIZEK, SUBLIME OBJECT, supra note 27, at 74.
33 See FiNK, supra note 1, at 45.
34 Zizek describes eastration as follows:
In short, by means of the Word, the subject finally finds himself, comes to himself: he
is no longer a mere obscure longing for himself since, in the Word, he directly attains
himself, posits himself as such. The price, however, is the irrefrievable loss of the
subject's self-identity: the verbal sign that stands for the subject—in which the subject
posits himself as self-identical—bears the mark of an irreducible dissonanee; it never
"fits" the subject. This paradoxical necessity on account of which the act of retumingto-oneself, of finding oneself, immediately, in its very actualization, assumes the form
of its opposite, of the radical loss of one's self-identity, displays the structure of what
Lacan calls "symbolic castration."
u
ZIZEK, INDIVISIBLE REMAINDER, supra note 30, at 46-47. in other words, 1 obtain my being m
the symbolic. Yet the symbolic is not me', 1 am alienated from my own being.
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realm—I rejoin the Real. Therefore, I eannot succeed. Rather, I succeed
only by failing.
ACTS

In the real, there is no time. As Kant emphasizes, time and space
are precisely the attributes of the subject that can distinguish things.
Yet, in every act, the subject gains a taste of the real. In the act is a
glimpse of wholeness—^what Lacan called enjoyment. When I enjoy, I
am fulfilled and feel whole. Time is suspended. Everything (and
therefore nothing) is present. The gap between the symbolic and the
real closes for an instant.
Enjoyment is fleeting, however (though time flies when you are
having fun). Enjoyment can never be "synchronized" with "the
symbolic order.If enjoyment were perpetual, I would be dead. 1
would have merged with the Real. Temporalization of experience will
have ceased. The superego therefore enjoins, "Do not close the gap.
Do not merge with the Real. You are castrated. Stay that way. In
short, do not act." This is how Lacan interprets the Incest Taboo.
Merging again with Mother is reinterpreted by Lacan to mean merging
with the Real. Such an aspiration is lethal. Its prohibition is the very
condition of the subject's continuance.
Yet the subject, suspended between the Real and the Symbolic,
desires to be whole. The act is designed to fulfill desire and procure
enjoyment. The subject—a "faculty of desire"^'—cannot help but act—
all the time. Every thought, every image generated in the brain is an
act, aiming at self-wholeness.
In order to enjoy, we must act. In the words of Georg Simmel, a
tum-of-the-century sociologist:
Human enjoyment of an object is a completely undivided act. At
such moments we have an experience that does not include an
awareness of an object confronting us or an awareness of the self as
distinct from its present condition. Phenomena of the basest and the

35 For Kant, time and space are pure a priori intuition. Time inheres not in the objects
themselves, but solely in the subject which intuits them. See CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON, supra
note 9, at 33. In Hegelian terms, time is "pure freedom in face of an 'other.'" G.W.F. HEGEL,
PHENOMENOLOGY OF SPIRIT § 679 (A.V. Miller trans., 1977) [hereinafter PHENOMENOLOGY OF
SPIRIT]. The "other" may be translated here as the real, and also as the symbolic. Thus, spirit in
its freedom appears only in time, but once it fully grasps what it is, it abolishes time. See id. §
801.
36 ZIZEK, TICKLISH SUBJECT, supra note 24, at 322.
37 IMMANUEL KANT, CRITIQUE OF PRACTICAL REASON 32 (T.K. Abbott trans., 1996)
[hereinafter CRITIQUE OF PRACTICAL REASON].
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highest kind meet here.^®

An "act" is some observable effect in the world, caused by a free human
being.^' An act suspends the symbolic and ethical truth and hence
violates it."*® Acts are thus traumatic."*' They disturb the underlying
fantasy of the audience."'^ The audience that observes the act must now
reconstruct the disrupted symbolic order in light of what it has
witnessed. In short, the act must be interpreted. Through interpretation,
the symbolic order is reconstituted in light of the act.
Transposed to law, we can say that acts are never lawful. As Zizek
has put it: "from the perspective of the existing positive Laws of a
symbolic community, an act appears by definition as Crime, since it
violates its symbolic limits and introduces an unheard-of element which
turns everything topsy-turvy.""'^
Such a conclusion may seem shocking at first. Surely not every act
is a crime."'"' Iff decide to buy a carton of milk and iff tender the askedfor price and take the milk home, have I committed a crime? The
answer is yes, on a certain psychoanalytic definition of law: the law of
the superego. This definition will appear extraordinary, but the
definition simply takes to its logical conclusion a feature of which
American jurisprudence is very fond indeed—right answers.
THE PATERNAL SUPEREGO

The element of law that the superego exploits to the hilt is the
requirement that action is to be judged according to pre-existing rules.
Ex post facto law does not even deserve the name "law.""'^ It is tyranny
38 GEORG SIMMEL, THE PHILOSOPHY OF MONEY 65 (David Frisby ed., Tom Bottomore &
David Frisby trans., 2d ed. 1990).
39 How do we know that there is such a thing as a free human being? Kant, the philosopher
of freedom par excellence, was not entirely sure. He could only "postulate" that it existed. That
is, no one can prove it does not exist and, therefore, we are licensed to believe in it (along with
God and immortality of the soul). See HENRY E. ALLISON, KANT'S THEORY OF FREEDOM 23038 (1990). On the role of postulation in Kant's thought, see GILLIAN ROSE, HEGEL CONTRA
SOCIOLOGY 95-97 (1981).
40 See ZI2EK, LOOKING AWRY, supra note 30, at 140; illEK, TOTALITARIANISM, supra note
9, at 161.
41 See SLAVOJ 2I2EK, TARRYING WITH THE NEGATIVE: KANT, HEGEL, AND THE CRITIQUE
OF IDEOLOGY 89 (1993) [hereinafter 2IZEK, TARRYING WITH THE NEGATIVE].
42 See ZI2EK, TICKLISH SUBJECT, supra note 24, at 200.
43 ZI2EK. ENJOYMENT AS A POLITICAL FACTOR, supra note 19, at 192.
44 Even the normally intrepid Ziiek shies away from this conclusion and aims at a distinction
between speech acts (which are sustained by a fantasy built from symbolic materials) and other
acts (which are ethical because they exceed the symbolic law). See 2I2EK, TICKLISH SUBJECT,
supra note 24, at 374-77; ZIZEK, TOTALITARIANISM, supra note 11, at 173. This distinction must
be renounced. Every act—speech acts and even thoughts—are subject to same dynamic of action
being described here.
45 See RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 85 (1986).
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as such.''^ Hence, first there must be a law. Then the act. The act will
be judged according to this pre-existent law.
The Superego rests upon this ordinary conservative notion. When
conservatives defend law, they usually insist that it is possible (at least
some of the time) for law to constrain judges. Indeed, it is a
conservative commonplace that judges should follow, andbot make, the
law. All psychoanalysis does is to take that notion very, very seriously.
It is said that the surest way to subvert a philosophical system is to
take it too seriously—^to be over-orthodox, to show the secret cards of
ideology.''^ Accordingly, we take to its extreme the principle that law
must precede action. We will be more Bork than Bork. Under this
principle, law is always perfectly certain and determinate. Right legal
answers exist. These are high virtues in right-wing jurisprudence, and
psychoanalysis adopts this view with a vengeance.
Prohibition and permission must exist in a strict correlation with
each other, if there are to be right answers. An act is either permitted or
prohibited. There can be no penumbra in which acts may or may not be
legal. Correlation is the key to jurisprudence itself. In a pathbreaking
work, Arthur Jacobson identifies five possible jurisprudences: Initially
we have (1) positive and (2) natural law. These are the correlative
jurisprudences. In these jurisprudences the legal field is completely
full, and right answers always exist (if only they could be found). The
other three are dynamic in nature. The dynamic legal universe is not
full but in the process of filling. The dynamic possibilities are (3) the
jurisprudence of right (Hegel), (4) jurisprudence of duty (Kant), and (5)
the jurisprudence of performativity (Anglo-American common law).''^
Ultimately, the last position—^performativity—will be the Lacanian
position.'^^ For now, we focus on the correlative jurisprudences—
positive and natural law. These systems (taken seriously) guarantee a
right answer. Whether law is "posited" by mere human beings or by
nature/God does not matter here. The dispute between positivists and
naturalists is a dispute about mere origin. Wherever law comes from,
we insist only that it fill the field completely. This law has no gaps.
There is always a right answer.
Outside of Dworkin, who courageously takes this position,few

Oddly, this is precisely the Lacanian view of the law of the superego. See infra text
accompanying notes 72-94.
47 See Slavoj Zizek, Why Does the Law Need an Obscene Supplement?, in LAW AND THE
POSTMODERN MIND; ESSAYS ON PSYCHANALYSIS AND JURISPRUDENCE 75, 89 (Peter Goodrich
& David Gray Carlson eds., 1998) [hereinafter Ziiek, Obscene Supplement^.
48 See Arthur J. Jacobson, Hegel's Legal Plenum, in HEGEL AND LEGAL THEORY 97 (Drucilla
Cornell et al. eds., 1991).
49 See infra text accompanying notes 115-53.
50 See DWORKIN, supra note 45, at 412; RONALD DwORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 144-

45 (1985).

2003]

THE TRA UMA TIC DIMENSION IN LA W

2297

would acknowledge the existence of brutally correlative law. Even
conservative lawyers, consulting their experience, would say that the
law includes unruly cases of first impression, which are ungovemed by
pre-existing law. On this view, there are gaps in the law that must be
filled in. There is room for the law to grow.
Any such concession, however, is a betrayal of conservative
principle. Conservatives may object at this point that no empirical
conservative (outside of Dworkin) believes the law is completely
present; what 1 describe is merely an ideal type of no descriptive worth.
To this claim, I respond that such a reaction only signals a profound fear
of confi-onting the true implication of conservative belief. The dearth of
empirical instances is of no matter, if conservatism as such is implicated
in the ideal type. All psychoanalysis does is to adhere to the stringent
requirement that law must precede action—the very foundation of
conservative jurisprudence. That empirical conservatives have no
courage of their convictions cannot serve to refute what follows.
Therefore, on ordinary tort law principles,^' conservatives are absolutely
responsible for the consequences of what I am about to explain. The
authentic conservative is "not afraid to pass to the act, to assume all the
consequences ...
What I now would like to suggest is that correlative jurisprudence
(where law always precedes the act) has a precise psychoanalytic
interpretation: it is the Freudian superego. The superego is absolute
perfect knowledge of pre-existing law. Proof of this proposition is an
important task of this Article. That proof will be coming in due
course.
Meanwhile, 1 have said that, for the superego, there is always a
right answer, per Dworkin. I now wish to go Dworkin one better and
suggest there is only one right answer: if you act, you are guilty. A law
that always precedes action has the effect of abolishing all action—
unless an act is a perfect repetition of some earlier act we know to be
legal. According to this Prussian, superegoic definition of law,
originality and spontaneity—freedom itself—are banished, because
freedom produces acts which are never vouchsafed by pre-existing
law.^"* In Joan Copjec's words, "The phenomenon of guilt is our proof
51 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 8A (stating that an act is intentional when "the
actor desires to cause consequences of his act, or that he believes that the consequences are
substantially certain to result from it").
53 ZlZEK, supra note 3, at 4.
53 See infra.
54 This is Kant's position:
Now, moral evil. . . brings with it an infinity of violations of the law, and hence an
infinity of guilt... not so much because of the infinity of the highest lawgiver whose
authority is thereby offended ... but because the evil is in the disposition . . .
KANT, RELIGION, supra note 10, at 89. See Joan Copjec, Introduction: Evil in the Time of the
Finite World, in RADICAL EVIL xiv (Joan Copjec ed., 1996) ("Common to Freud and Kant is the
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that the subject is free, that it exceeds the historical content in which
alone it realizes itself.
The free act is original and spontaneous. If perfect repetition were
possible, legality would likewise be possible. Perfect repetition was
possible in the Garden of Eden, until Eve ate of the tree of Imowledge.^^
Since then, repetition has been ruled out. Nowadays, sin is strictly
original. And what is sin? Precisely the jouissance of the act, in which
the bounds of the Symbolic realm are transcended.^^
It is because of freedom's
jouissance that all actions are
condemned by superegoic law. In every act, there is at least one
original element—its authorship by a unique individual. The freedom
of the individual to act is a radically incommensurate element always
infused into the act itself. This element guarantees that no act can be
underwritten in advance by the law. Quite the opposite is true. All acts
are by definition creative and hence condemned.
Radical freedom, then, is a noumenal concept postulated as

unexpected assertion not only that moral conscience is always certain, but that it is, moreover,
eertain of only one thing: its guilt."). It is also Hegel's position. See PHENOMENOLOGY OF
SPIRIT, supra note 35, §§ 398-400. Thus, Hegel describes the act as the "original determinacy"
and the birth of individuality: "action is itself nothing else but negativity." Id. § 399.
COPJEC, READ MY DESIRE, supra note 5, at xvi. The universality of guilt also implies that
guilt is not a moral term but, instead, an ontological one. See BERTHOLD-BOND, supra note 25, at

171.

56 Augustine suggests that paradise is the union of jouissance and knowledge. AUGUSTINE,

THE CITY OF GOD 457-75 (Mareus Dods trans., 1950). That is to say, when Adam and Eve acted
(i.e., engaged in sexual intercourse), they did not lose themselves or blank out. In effect, the
omnipresence of knowledge, even during the act, meant that Adam and Eve were "perfectly"
rational. They had no hidden uneonsciousness. They had perfeet control over their bodies. They
could therefore be sure that their aets were lawful and fully vouchsafed by pre-existent law—i.e.,
perfectly repetitive. See Miran Bozovic, Malebranche 's Occasionalism, or, Philosophy in the
Garden of Eden, in SiC 2: COGITO AND THE UNCONSCIOUS 148, 157-63 (Slavoj tizek ed., 1998);
SCHROEDER, supra note 14, at 90. This is the eonceit of sexual perversion: "the fundamental
illusion of the pervert is that he possesses a (symbolic) knowledge that enables him to regulate his
access to jouissance." ZLZEK, TICKLISH SUBJECT, supra note 24, at 322.

57 According to Miran BozoviC:
What was it that Adam did? Or, more precisely, what was it that he did not do? ...
What Adam did not do was to make use of the power he had over his body: upon
joining himself to . . . "the forbidden fruit," Adam did not suppress the sensation of
pleasure that God was producing in his mind, but rather, abandoned himself to it. And
it was precisely by not renouncing the pleasure immediately after it fulfilled its
advisory function, that Adam crossed the line between innocence and sin... . Adam
allowed his mind's capacity to be exhausted by the sensation of pleasure, to the extent
that the darkness . . . obscured the light of reason. Having thus been distracted, Adam
never regained his mind's attention. What the sensation of pleasure, which Adam was
unwilling to renounce, erased from his mind, was the mind's "clear perception, which
informed him that God was his good, the sole cause of his pleasures and joy, and that
he was to love only Him."... It was, therefore, nothing less than the very truth of
occasionalism [i.e., the position that God is the only cause of things] that was erased
from Adam's mind. And therein lies Adam's sin.
Bozovic, supra note 56, at 163 (intemal citation omitted).
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existing separate and apart from the chain of causal being.^^ Only
conscious, speaking human beings are free and hence guilty in the allseeing eye of superegoic law. Animals—or psychotic human beings—
are acquitted because they lack this freedom. Animals and psychotics
conform to the law precisely because they are incapable of acting. The
proper act is an act of freedom—inherently illegal and beyond the
bounds of the symbolic order. Nothing done by a free individual can
live up to the demands of superegoic law, which despises (but requires)
freedom itself.
I have said that law as experienced even by conservative lawyers
has gaps in it. But the law in which there are always right answers is
the Freudian superego.^^ What this implies is that there is no distinction
between positive and natural law. Positivists claim that law and
morality are not necessarily connected.^" What they do not grasp is that
positive law and morality are the same thing, so long as one insists that
law always precedes human action and there are right legal answers.
One must, however, distinguish between external social regulation (law
experienced as full of gaps) and internal moral law (which has no gaps).
The difference between these two laws is the difference between reality
and the Real.^' Conservatives who admit there are not always right
answers are talking about social reality. But the realm in which right
answers are guaranteed is where the superego emerges to condemn all
acts. This Real moment, as we shall see, is the traumatic dimension in
law.®2
HART

Superegoic law admits to no gaps. Its perfection consists precisely
of its opposition to all action. But no living legal theorist will admit that
superegoic law is in effect in society. The vision is simply too extreme.
It violates the experience that all lawyers attest to—there is not always a
58 See CRITIQUE OF PRACTICAL REASON, supra note 37, at 32 (causality not determinable by
physical laws); CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON, supra note 9, at 33 (liberty is absolute spontaneity,
an unconditioned as first member of a causal series); id. at 300 (the causality of freedom is not
subordinated to another cause determining it in time; freedom is not given in experience and is
independent of impulse).
59 See Alenka ZupanCifi, The Subject of the Law, in SiC 2: COGITO AND THE UNCONSCIOUS
41, 41 (Slavoj 2i2ek ed., 1998) (stating that "what philosophy calls the moral law and, more
precisely, what Kant calls the categorical imperative, is in fact nothing other than the superego").
50 See ANOTHY SEBOK, LEGAL POSITIVISM IN AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE 272, 314-15
(1998).

5' See hiEK, TICKLISH SUBJECT, supra note 24, at 132. On the role of social regulation as
relieving the unbearable pressure of the superego, see Jeatme L. Schroeder & David Gray
Carlson, Review Essay, Kenneth Starr: Diabolically Evil?, 88 CAL. L. REV. 653 (2000).
52 See hiEK, TICKLISH SUBJECT, supra note 24, at 280.
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correct legal answer.
Still, only bad legal realism goes to the other extreme by denying
the existence of any right answer. Empirically, most Anglo-American
legal theorists are in the middle. They think that there are usually right
answers, although sometimes the law is unclear. In other words, law
mostly but not always precedes action.
Such a vision most famously can be found in the work of H.L.A.
Hart.^3 In an approach that aims to be "descriptive," rather than
"conceptual,"64 Hart supposedly accounts for uncertainty in the law. He
emphasized that law was mostly determinate.^^ At such moments, law
had a certain, eore meaning.66
core is where judges have irnmediate
knowledge.67 Here is where legal phenomenon perfectly coincides with
legal noumenon.6^
Sometimes, however. Hart claimed that no right answer precedes
the case. These cases are located in law's penumbra, where the judge
has discretion to make new law—i.e., legislate.^^ Thus, Hart attempted
to account for the uncanny feeling that all lawyers have ^there is no
clear answer out there, at least some of the time.^ Because this
experience is proclaimed (though never proven) to be "penumbral," the
Rule of Law is preserved.
Paradoxically, in spite of his emphasis on law's "'open texture.
Hart nevertheless subscribes fully to superegoic law—law with no gaps,
law in which there are only unique right answers. Hart tries to account
for legal uncertainty, but he never abandons the premise of correlative
superegoic law. In Hart's thought—and contrary to psychoanalytic
theory—^these gaps are determinate gaps. If law has gaps in it, then
there must be a law of the gap. We must know in advance which acts
are in the core and which acts are in the penumbra. But to really know
an act is to know everything about an act—^to know its complete
context. This is radical knowledge indeed—superegoic knowledge.
Once the act's complete context is known, we certainly know whether
the act is in the core or in the penumbra. Hence, law knows precisely
5EE EENERA/FY H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW (1961).

, N J-

I T!

F

64 And this in spite of the title of Hart's book. See Gerald P. Moran, A Radical Theory of
Jurisprudence: The "Decisionmaker" as the Source of Law-The Ohio
^
Adoption of the Spendthrift Trust Doctrine as a Model, 30 AKRON L. REV. 393^1 (199 ).
65 HART, supra note 63, at 148 ("overwhelming majonty of cases ). This is, ot course,
asserted and not proved.
j
-71
66 Id. at 121-32. See H.L.A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals,
HARV.L. REV. 593, 607 (1958).

ron.T, RPV 781 802
67 See Margaret Jane Radin, Reconsidering the Rule of Law, 69 B.U. L. REV. 781, 80

(1988).

68 A Hegelian coincidence that I will very much defend later on.

69 "If a penumbra of uncertainty must surround all legal rules, then their application to
specific cases in the penumbral area cannot be a matter of logical deduction." Hart, supra note
66, at 607.

70 HART, supra note 63, at 133.
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where the boundary is between core and penumbra, and it toows
precisely where any given act is to be located. Even when an act falls in
the penumbra, it is fully regulated in advance. The law of the penumbra
is simply that the actor is subjected to the caprice of the judge.
e
superegoic "correlative" aspect of law is therefore at the core of
Hart's positivist jurisprudence.'''
.
Under our extreme version of positive law {i.e., positive law taken
seriously), whether we apply Hart's innovation or not, fuU law precedes
every act. The law is completely determinate (even if it determines
certain acts to be in the penumbra where judges are invited to enjojO.
Every act that has ever been performed has already been judged. The
number of permitted acts is strictly finite. Hence, the only acts
permitted by such a law are pure repetitions—mechanical acts.
Creativity is unlawful. Yet no act is repetitive, because it is always
authored by a spontaneous free individual. In short, all acts are cnmes.
THE MATERNAL SUPEREGO

No matter what we do, we fail to live up to the law of the superep.
More familiarly, it is impossible to please our parents or God O-^-^yhat
Lacan calls the big Other).'^ Nothing is good enough for this big Other
We are condemned in advance. As Hegel emphasized, innocence y jus
a name for non-action. Action as such is guilt.'^ This explains why we
feel so guilty all the time-why "[o]ur guilt is all we know of the
law."'''' Hegel puts it this way:
No man is a hero to his valet; not, however, because the man is not a
hero, but because the valet—is a valet, whose dealings are with the
man, not as a hero, but as one who eats, drinks, and wears clothes, in
general, with his individual wants and fancies. Thus, for the judging
consciousness, there is no action in which it could not oppose to the
universal aspect of the action, the personal aspect of he
individuality, and play the part of the moral valet towards the

so, at 139, .52; SrAVOl Z12BK, THB MHTASTASHS
OF ENJOYMBNT: SIX ESSAYS ON WOMAN AND CAUSALITY 42 (1994) [hereinafter ZLZBK,
Hegel writes of consciousness splitting itself in two when it
raises itseftto^actwiL^ specific quality of the ethical life, of being the simple certainty of
immediate truth, and initiates the division of itself into itself as the active pnnciple ^
irthe reality over against it, a reality which, for it, is negative. By the deed,
therefore, it becomes guilt.

PHBNOMENOLOGY OF SPIRIT, supra note 35, § 468.
74 COPJEC, READ MY DESIRE, supra note 5, at xiv.
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In other words, because every act is individual the moral valet finds it
wanting in purity.
^
,.
What we now have before us tout court is the Freudian superep.
This "'severe master' of the ego"^^ is the part of personality that
prohibits. It is quite totalitarian in its attitude." What does Ac
superego prohibit? In Lacanian theory, it prohibits enjoyment. We
enioy our own acts and for that reason we are condemned m advance if
we act. We are always at war with our own superego when we act.
Wholeness is what "acts" aim at. In action, the subject seeks to
satisfy desire—to provoke a merger with the Real." If the subject is the
gap between the Symbolic and the Real {i.e., a faculty of desire), the
subject acts precisely to fill the gap. Yet this is what the superego
prohibits. In action, the subject literally (but fleetingly) withdraws from
the symbolic order entirely.It is for this reason that we can say that
all action is prohibited. Action is incestuous, m the Lacanian sense. It
is psyehoticsi and terroristie.^z We enjoy ourselves when we act, and
this is precisely what is prohibited.
The superego that prohibits is the paternal superego—the superego
that knows and sees all.^^ It condemns everything. But what it
condemns happens not to be possible. A merger wtth the real wou d
constitute our obliteration. Hence, it is said, suicide is the o^
successful act. Only in suicide is the gap between the real and
symbolic finally closed.^^ Any act short of this is doomed to fail.
This leads to a strange inversion m the superego. The patema
superego which deprives the subject of all enjoyment expropnates this
surplus and uses it in aid of its perverse maternal sid^e.
Thus, the
superego (which prohibits) simultaneously says, "Go ahead and enjoy,
you failure. Nothing will come of it."^^ The superego dares us to act.
75 PHENOMENOLOGY OF SPIRIT, supra note 35, § 665 (footnote omitted).
76 ZILEK, PLAGUE OF FANTASIES, supra note 32, at 171.
II ffhowel^, we listen to the superego and fail to act, we suffer from ""^session " to.

SUBLIME OBJECT, supra note 27, at 59, or "neuroses." ZTTEK, METASTASES OF ENJO
'"^TsTAmEY R^EN, G.W.F. HEGEL: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE SCIENCE OF WISDOM 155
(1974) ("The desire for satisfaction is a desire for complete self-consciousness. ).
80 "In action," Hamlet says, "how like an angel! In apprehension, how like a god. WILLIA

SHAKESPEARE, HAMLET, Act II, Scene 2.
81 See ZiiEK, TICKLISH SUBJECT, supra note 24, at 60.
82 See id. at 377-78.
83 ZUPANCIC, supra note 16, at 147.
84 7I2EK TARRYING WITH THE NEGATIVE, sitpra note 41, at 31.
85 Ss i; emphasized by St. Paul in Romarrs 7:7. See also Romans 5:20 ("law came in, with
the result that the trespass multiplied").

Rir 5- TooiTO AND THE

86 See Renata Salecl, The Silence of the Feminine Jouissance, in SiC 2. COGITO AND THE

UNCONSCIOUS 175, 189 (Slavoj Ziiek ed., 1998).
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knowing that we cannot succeed.
This second aspect of the superego is quite as necessary as the first.
In the first aspect, the superego condemns all acts. Yet, if we took the
superegoic program too seriously, the subject would do nothing. Such a
subject would suffer from "obsessional neurosis"—^paralysis in the face
of the big Other's disapproval.^^ The subject who takes the superego
too seriously thus undermines the superegoic regime. A certain distance
between the subject and the regime is needed, if the regime of the
superego is to perform its function of condemnation. Law as such can
never appear unless the subject acts. Without action, the superego
would disappear. Therefore, the superego requires a carnival, or a
Mardi Gras, during which the subject turns everything topsy-turvy and
acts.8« Yet, ironically, when the subject acts, she disrupts the very
superegoic regime that required the act. All acts are therefore "death"
drives. This is why Zizek writes: "the very existence of subjectivity
involves the 'false', 'abstract' choice of Evil, of Crime—that is, an
excessive 'unilateral' gesture which throws the harmonious Order of the
Whole out of balance."^® In effect, the law sacrifices itself in requiring
the subject to act in contravention of law. It is therefore our grim duty
to the law that we enjoy its transgression.^''
This maternal side of the superego, taken to its extreme, incites the
subject to absolute rage and enjoyment, where everything is obliterated
in Dionysian frenzy.^' Thanks to the maternal superego, we feel guilty
when we do not enjoy.The superego condemns us both for acting and
not acting.
The fact that superegoic law requires the obscene enjoyment of the
subject is precisely what must not be revealed. This is the prohibition
against (but covert sponsorship of) pornography—i.e., reduction of the
subject to an object for the enjoyment of the big Other. Should it be
revealed that the superego depends on the act's obscenity, then the
superegoic law's complicity in the very crimes it condemns would be
exposed.
87 See ZIZEK, METASTASES OF ENJOYMENT, supra note 72, at 13.
88 See Zizek, Obscene Supplement, supra note 47, at 90-91.
89 ZIZEK, TICKLISH SUBJECT, supra note 24, at 96.; See id. at 99,160.
90 The Lacanians call this the "forced choice." On the necessity of this, see Schroeder &
Carlson, supra note 61.
91 See 2IZEK, TICKLISH SUBJECT, supra note 24, at 97, 126, 156. See also JUDITH BUTLER,
THE PSYCHIC LIFE OF POWER: THEORIES IN SUBJECTION 49 (1997) ("The repressive law is not
external to the libido that it represses, but the repressive law represses to the extent that repression
becomes a libidinal activity.").
92 See ZIZEK, TICKLISH SUBJECT, supra note 24, at 160. This is the double guilt of the death
of God. When God dies, it is upon us to enjoy and we cannot. See SLAVOJ ZIZEK, ENJOY YOUR
SYMPTOM!: JACQUES LACAN IN HOLLYWOOD AND OUT 167 (1992) [hereinafter ZIZEK, ENJOY
YOUR SYMPTOM]. Thus, Lacan turns Dostoevski around: If God does not exist, then nothing is
permitted. See THE SEMINAR OF JACQUES LACAN, BOOK 11, The Ego in Freud's Theory and in
the Technique of Psychoanalysis 128 (1988).
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Jeanne Schroeder beautifully describes the injunction of the
superego to enjoy. The law must, on the one hand, deny its complicity
in crime. On the other hand, the law will not function without feminine
enjoyment—i.e., the act.^^ Accordingly, the "act" is the primordial
crime and also the crime that is constantly with us. It is diabolical
evil—a necessary obscene underside of superegoic law.^''
To summarize our progress so far, we took an aspect of law that
everyone agrees is admirable. Law must precede action. The judge
cannot simply make up the law on the spot, or what we have is tyranny,
not law. Every conservative believes this—and suspects the Supreme
Court tyrannizes us with made-up constitutional doctrines falsely
attributed to the penumbra of the Constitutional text. We have taken
this conservative belief and, and although it went hard on us, we have
bettered the instruction. We have rendered this aspect of law truly
extreme—well beyond that which the covert wimp Robert Bork would
allow—and we have discovered that we have out lawed all human
freedom—defined as the subject's spontaneity.Perfectly determinate
law turned out to be the superego, which opposes the idea of action.
But also, in its maternal phase, superegoic law requires action in order
to perpetuate itself.
CRIME

I have suggested that every act is original. It exceeds the symbolic
order of law. All action is therefore crime. But what is crime?
A crime is that which denies universality to the symbolic order.
Crime announces that law is not law. For Hegel, crime "constitutes a
negatively infinite judgemenf"^^ (e-g-> "the rose is not an elephant"). As
Hegel puts it:
Crime may be quoted as an objective instance of the negatively
infinite judgement. The person committing a crime . . . does not. . .
merely deny the particular right of another person .... He denies the
right of that person in general, and therefore he is not merely forced
to restore what he has stolen, but is punished in addition, because he
has violated law as law . .. .^^

93 See JEANNE L. SCHROEDER, THE TRIUMPH OF VENUS: THE EROTICS OF THE MARKET
(forthcoming).
94 Diabolical evil is evil done for nonpathological reasons. It therefore meets Kant's
categorical imperative and is therefore indistinguishable from morality. See generally Schroeder
& Carlson, supra note 61.
93 See CRITIQUE OF PRACTICAL REASON, supra note 37, at 66; CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON,
supra note 9, at 87-88, 227, 230.
96 HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY QF RIGHT, supra note 12, § 95.
97 HEGEL'S LOGIC § 173 (William Wallace trans., 1975) (1873). On why crime is a negative
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On this definition, all acts are crimes. When a subject acts, the
symbolic order is denied all its force. Yet acts are likewise the very
attribute of a free subject. We are free to act. Therefore, we may
conclude that (superegoic) law is absolutely incompatible with human
freedom.
»
Paradoxically, law itself must be legislated. In other words, tor
there to be law, there must be a legislative "act." This means that
positive law itself is a crime—t/ie primordial crime. It is the murder of
Father Enjoyment and the institution of the Name-of-the-Father in his
p l a c e . Y e t p o s i t i v e l a w h a s t h e b a d m a n n e r s t o d e n o u n c e u s f o r our
crimes.
,
The foundational violence of law has by now engendered an
enormous philosophical literature.^^ Such literature must be understood
precisely in the Lacanian sense of "act." Which is to say that law is not
necessarily "violent" in the lay sense of the term. I n legal circles,
Robert Cover has made fashionable the notion that law is violent, but
he usually does not refer to the speculative content of "law as act."
Thus, he writes:
Judges are people of violence. Because of the violence they
command, judges characteristically do not create law, but kill it.
Theirs is the jurispathic office. Confronting the luxuriant growth of
a hundred legal traditions, they assert that this one is law and destroy
or try to destroy the rest.'®'

While Cover's work is no doubt justly celebrated for its profound depth
of noble feeling, it certainly does not operate at the Lacanian level. In
Cover's view, law is de-centered. It is not the property of the state.
Rather, it encompasses the norms of diverse communities.
Communities, not the state, are the hallmarks of political virtue.'®^ In
short what we have here is basically the new age theme of let a
thousand flowers bloom."'®^ What is missing from this account is the
judge's very act of deciding always kills all law, even the law it
infinite judgment, see Jeanne L. Schroeder & David Gray Carlson, The Appearance of Wrong and
the Essence of Right, 24 CARDOZO L. REV. 2481 (2003).
98 SIGMUND FREUD, TOTEM AND TABOO (STANDARD EDITION) (James Strachey trans.,
1996) For Lacan's rewriting of this myth, see Jacques Lacan, Introduction to the Names-oftheFather Seminar, in JACQUEI LACAN, TELEVISION: A
TO THE
ESTABLISHMENT 81 (Jeffrey Mehlman trans., Joan Copjec ed., 1990) (1974), ZI2EK, TICKLISH

SUBJECT, 5MPRA note 24, at 314-18.

R , .I.

Quaintance trans., 1992).

/i
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99 See eg Jacques Derrida, Force of Law: The "Mystical Foundation of Authority in
DECONSTRUCTION AND THE POSSIBILITY OF JUSTICE 3 (Drucilla Cornell et al. eds., Mary
100 See Robert M. Cover, Forward: Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4 (I9»J).
102 See Paul W. Kahn, Community in Contemporary Constitutional Theory, 99 YALE L.J. 1,
57-59 n989y
103 See generally Suzanne Last Stone, In Pursuit of the Counter-Text:
Legal Model in Contemporary American Legal Theory, 106 HARV. L. REV. 813, 823-32 (199 ).
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purports to uphold,and that legal reasoning is the psychoanalytic cure
the judge must undertake to assuage the guilt.
The speculative inquiry inspired by Hegel and Lacan shows law to
be much more violent that Cover imagined and also less so. It is more
so in that every act of judge and subject alike traumatizes the symbolic
order Hegel and Lacan exult in the violence of law at this level. Cover
abhon-ed it (thus revealing his fundamental romanticism).It is less
violent than Cover imagined because submission to and transgression oi
law constitutes the ordinary course of social growth. For Cover, when
law is violent, it is catastrophic to its victims. Hence, Cover implies a
division between violent and non-violent judicial acts. Lacan saw the
violence in every single act—judicial or laic.
INTERPRETATION

Once a human being acts in violation of the law, a traumatic event
has occurred. Trauma is that which disturbs the equilibrium of the
symbolic order. In order to re-establish this equilibrium, the subject
must "interpret" or "subjectify" the act, if she can.'''^
This interpretation constitutes the rearrangement of the symbolic
order of law. Interpretation always entails the discovery of a
cause.It establishes a new symbolic network by means of which
"[hlistory again acquires the self-evidence of a linear evolution,
Once the act is symbolized—made subject to the rule of law the
trauma disappears. This is "the moment of closure when the subject s
act ofdecision changes into its opposite."'!" The trauma is "cured.
The interpretation may well be, "She acted legally, even morally.
Thus, when you bought your carton of milk for the required price with
valid currency, you are subsequently judged innocent. Any such
judgment, after the deed, claims that you had no spark of originality in
104 Thus legal interpretation merely threatens violence, implying that nonviolent mterpr^tion
might be possible. See Robert M. Cover, The Bonds of Constitutional Interpretatton: Of the
Word the Deed, and the Role,f

•

i,,

105 One may also complain of Cover that, although he celebrates the particulansin of mstUar
communities, he speaks in the name of a universality that he does not actaowledp.
e
universalism is the violence Cover abhors. Hence, he is just as violent as those he criticizes. See

ZIZEK, TICKLISH SUBJECT, SMPRA note 24, at 170.
•
u- v, .i t ft,»
anH
106 Cover thus exhibits the pose of the "beautiful soul" who wnngs his hands at the world and
wishes to be aloof from it, but is, contrary to this pose, just as implicated in it as is anyone else.
supra note 1, at 63. Of course, the subject may attempt to repress the trauma aiid
refuse to confront it-a less healthy alternative.
ZIZEK, PLAGUE OF FANTASIES, supra note
32, at 79.
^
108 See ZIZEK, ENJOYMENT AS A POLITICAL FACTOR , supra note 19, at loi.
109 Id. at 190.
110 Id.
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your act. In effect, you are treated as an unfree object incapable of
creativity. You are accused of perfect plagiarism, as it were. Thus, in
your acquittal lurks the accusation of yet another high crime and
misdemeanor.'"
This judgment, however, is more in the nature of a pardon than an
acquittal. Such a judgment deliberately overlooks the act's lawlessness.
The truth of your acquittal is that you really deserved to be condemned.
Instead of condemning you, the underlying law has been retroactively
conformed to accommodate your earlier lawless act. Presume not that
the law is the thing it was. Rather, the trauma of your act disrupted the
former law. Your act has been fully symbolized in a brand new law."^
The innocence you have been accorded is the mercy of the big Other,
which has elected to sacrifice and transform itself in order to smooth
over your criminal act—your jouissance of that pathological carton of
milk.
What we have here is not legal judgment but mercy, precisely
because it cannot be demanded. Subjects are constantly demanding
"justice" from the symbolic order—the missing part to which the
subject is entitled and which would make the subject w h o l e . T h e
symbolic order never listens to the demand for justice. It is no "strict
court of Venice." Only when the subject learns not to demand justice
does the symbolic order condescend to forgive the subject's crime."''
If the pattern keeps up—if action wins forgiveness after the fact—
we invoke a rather different, more flexible notion of what law is. The
conclusion that an act was consistent with pre-existent law means that
law is defined differently from its strict correlative form of superegoic
law. In such a definition, law is not an aggregate of particulars, but an
aggregate of universal principles, under which a legal actor is accorded
some scope of freedom. So conceived, law no longer represents the
superego. But the price is the betrayal of conservative principles. Law
no longer precedes the act.
" ' I n Hegel's words, the strictness of the superego (what Hegel calls "fate") "often seems to
pass over into the most crying injustice when it makes its appearance, more terrible than ever,
over against the most exalted form of guilty, the guilt of innocenee." G.W.F. HEGEL, The Spirit
of Christianity and its Fate, in EARLY THEOLOGICAL WRITINGS 232 (T.M. Knox trans., 1948).
"2 See FINK, supra note 1, at 71 ("To understand means to locate or embed one configuration
of signifiers within another. ... [Sjomething makes sense when it fits into the pre-existing
chain.").
"3 On this aspect of justice, see generally Carlson, supra note 8.
"4 See ZIZEK, TARRYING WITH THENEGATIVE, supra note 41, at 169. Why, then, should one
do "good" acts when there is no guaranty that the symbolic order will render the deeds of mercy?
Grace is like the rain. It falls where it falls. Perhaps it will fall on the fertile plain, perhaps on the
barren hillside. If the peasant does the good deed of cultivating the plain, the peasant will profit if
the rain happens to fall on the plain. But cultivation never guarantees the rainfall. See liiEK,
PLAGUE OF FANTASIES, supra note 32, at 79. The very possibility of the good act presupposes
that the subject can rebel against the existing order in the name of a better order. See ZIZEK,
ABYSS OF FREEDOM, supra note 26, at 54.
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NARRATIVE

In the above account, every act violates the pre-existing,
determinate law of the superego. The subject must, in effect, forget the
law in order to act."^ The act is a pre-rational, "Real" event that
crashes through the trappings of the symbolic realm and encounters the
Real.
The subject, in this account, is always alienated from her own act.
This follows from the Lacanian definition of the subject. In Lacanian
terms, the subject is the gap between the symbolic and the Real. If the
subject is this gap, and if acts are in the Real, then it follows that the
agent is always alienated and separate from (yet author of) its act.
Furthermore, as the act contains the element of subjective responsibility,
the subject alienated from the act is always self-alienated. The subject
is literally caught in the act.
When a subject acts, she is always, to some degree, surprised by
what she has wrought. The act teaches the subject who she is and what
she is capable of. One might say that an actress performs for an
audience, but, uncannily, the actress is always in the audience herself,
witnessing her own act—a wonder wounded hearer amidst the
groundsmen."^
Phenomenologically, the subject is a series of traumatic acts
recollected across time."'' The self-conscious subject is the negative
unity that strings together all these acts into a coherent whole over time.
Memory of what she did requires a continuity of self from day to day.
This implies that the subject breaks free from the present and recognizes
herself as a "universal" that is separate and apart from the present. In
other words, in her acts, the subject transcends the natural present and
becomes historicized. Acts, in contrast, being Real events, do not exist
in time. Only the self-conscious subject, remembering the nowsymbolized act, has any sense of time. Self-consciousness is nothing
but unity over time. What it unites are the symbolized acts of a lifetime.
Every act by the subject is a trauma. The act is at bottom an
115 See ZIZEK, LOOKING AWRY, supra note 30, at 212.
11® See COPJEC, READ MY DESIRE, supra note 5, at xvi ("human will can only realize itself in
a content that alienates it from itself. . . "); ZUPANCIC, supra note 16, at 225 ("I experience my
own enjoyment... as strange and hostile."). This explains why Zizek can write of the act as a
foreign body or intruder in the subject, and why the actor must always keep a distance from her
own acts. See ZIZEK, TICKLISH SUBJECT, supra note 24, at 374. "The act thus designates the
level at which the fundamental division and displacements usually associated with the 'Lacanian
subject' ... are momentarily suspended . ..." Id. at 375. If it were otherwise, the agent would
then be at the level of the act. See id. at 376. Here we would have Adam and Eve (i.e., sexual
perversion), and Kant's puppet of God. See supra note 56
117 See HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT, supra note 12, § 124.; see also JOSEPH C. FLAY,

HEGEL'S QUEST FOR CERTAINTY 137 (1984).
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unconscious act"^ that disrupts the fantasy realm. Fantasy is in turn the
narrative the subject has constructed about herself and what she is.
Thus, a subject learns what she is by contemplating her acts."'
Together, the others—and the actress herself—will symbolize the
traumatic act and reestablish a new order."® Once the act is
symbolized, "[t]he pricks of conscience have become blunt, since Ae
deed's evil spirit has been chased away; there is no longer anything
hostile in the man, and the deed remains at most as a soulless carcass
lying in the charnel-house of actualities, in memories.""^ This
exorcism of the act is what narration aims at.
The narrative that the agent constructs about her acts constitutes
the very stuff of legal reasoning. In the narrative, the subject learns that
she acted because of reasons A, B, and C. Cause is retroactively posited
to explain the act so that the trauma of acting can be integrated into the
fantasy in which the subject lives.Thus, cause is much more
radically conceived in psychoanalysis than in ordinary science. Cause
in science is the law. Cause in psychoanalysis is precisely that which
disrupts the law."^
Narrative acts are always failures. They never completely remove
the trauma of the act. Recall that, in Lacanian terms, the subject is
always a gap between the symbolic and the Real. Entry into the
symbolic realm of law constitutes the historicization of acts by the
subject. The symbolic materials expropriated by the subject to describe
her acts do not constitute a positive whole. Rather, the subject is a
negative unity holding together various shards of symbolic material, but
there is always something missing to fill out the gap."^ What is missing
118 See FINK, supra note 1, at 37.
119 See PHENOMENOLOGY OF SPIRIT, supra note 35, § 401 ("Consciousness must act merely in
order that what it is in itself may become explicit/or it.. . action is simply the coming-to-be of
Spirit as consciousness")-, JEAN HYPPOLITE, GENESIS AND STRUCTURE OF KEGELS
PHENOMENOLOGY OF SPIRIT 12 (Samuel Chemiak & John Heckman trans., 1974) ( But action is
necessary, and through it the self of self-consciousness emerges from its obscurity and becomes
dctufll

120 siavoj Ziiek, The Cartesian Subject versus the Cartesian Theater, in SlC 2: COGITO AND
THE UNCONSCIOUS 246, 256 (Slavoj Zizek ed., 1998) ("[T]he answer to the question 'Why do we
tell stories?' is that the narrative as such emerges in order to resolve some fundamental
antagonism by way of rearranging its terms into a temporal succession.''); see also
STAVRAKAKIS, supra note 6, at 86 ("In the face of the irreducibility of the real we have no other
option but to symbolize
").
121 HEGEL,II/PRAnote 111,at232.
^ u i .i122 Needless to say, there is voluminous literature on law and narrative. One of the leading
progenitors of this movement, Richard Delgado, recognizes the therapeutic nature of narrative
(for the "out" groups), but he also adds that the narratives of the "outs" are traumatic for the
"ins." See Richard Delgado, Storytelling for Oppositionists and Others: A Plea for Narrative, 87
MICH. L.REV. 2411,2412(1989).
123 See FINK, supra note 1, at 28, 64.
124
I'LJ. at 140-41.
. , . , „
125 See COPJEC, READ MY DESIRE, supra note 5, at 125 ("In response to anxiety s signal ot
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is the objet petit a.
The objet petit a is one of Lacan's profound contributions to
philosophy.126 This object is the "little other"i27—the material that, if
acquired, supposedly would make the subject whole. The act is
always an attempt to obtain this objet petit a.
The objet petit a, however, is a paradoxical object. It is in fact a
non-object—a metonym.i2s
short, the idea of the Thing that would
make the subject whole is a falsehood, a "not," and an impossibility.
We search in vain for it in positive reality. Yet the objet petit a can only
be perceived if it has a positive content. Hence, the subject constantly
"sublimates." Sublimation is integration of the objet petit a into the
order of the signifier.'29 That is, a positive thing is associated with the
objet petit a. It is '"elevated to the dignity of the Thing.We feel
pain because we don't have some thing—an unrequited love or a really
"good" law review acceptance. If only we could get this one thing,
everything would be all right.in fact, this Thing is simply a place
holder for the negative object petit a.
The "aet," always an attempt to obtain the Thing, is doomed to fail.
Even if we win a token of love or a prestigious academic position, we
only discover that the thing obtained was not really the objet petit a. An
uncaptured surplus enjoyment exceeds that actual sublimated object we
have obtained.122 The act is destined to fail, even when it succeeds.
Indeed, a truly successful act would mean closure and death.
Not only is the act unsuccessful, but the narrative account of the
act is likewise unsuccessful. This is because every attempt to fill this
gap with words—^the post hoc narrative to excuse our act—is itself an

hKK'

danger, one flees or avoids the real. But one flees into a symbolic whose hedge against the real is
secured only through its negation of the real, that is, through its failure to eoineide with itself, to
guarantee itself").
126 See FINK, supra note 1, at 83.
122 The small letter a stands for flwtre, or other.
128 Metonymy is the inability to name the thing directly, but only the context surrounding the
thing. Metonymy so defined recognizes the negative constitution of things. See Michel
Rosenfeld, The Identity of the Constitutional Subject, in LAW AND THE POSTMODERN MIND:
ESSAYS ON PSYCHOANALYSIS AND JURISPRUDENCE 157-65 (Peter Goodrich & David Gray
Carlson eds., 1998); Jeanne L. Schroeder, The Midas Touch: The Lethal Effect of Wealth
Maximization, 1999 WIS. L. REV. 687, 763 ("In metonymy, the signified always remains hidden,
and negative.") [hereinafter Schroeder, Midas Touch],
129 See ZizEK, ABYSS OF FREEDOM, supra note 26, at 78.

130 SLAVOJ ZIZEK, THE FRAGILE ABSOLUTE OR. WHY IS THE CHRISTIAN LEGACY WORTH
FIGHTING FOR? 26 (2000).

131 The objet petit a as lost object only comes to be by being left behind. Narrative occludes
the paradox by describing the process in which the object is first given and then gets lost. See
ZIZEK, PLAGUE OF FANTASIES, supra note 32, at 13. Fullness is "a retroactively produced
fiction." STAVRAKAKIS, supra note 6, at 44.
132 Perhaps someone stole this surplus enjoyment. If so, we have the architectonic of racism
or anti-semitism. See RENATA SALECL, THE SPOILS OF FREEDOM: PSYCHOANALYSIS AND

FEMINISM AFTER THE FALL OF SOCIALISM (1994).
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act. Acts are doomed to fail. That is, narrative is "performance" which,
by definition, must fail.
In short, speaking or even thinking'^^ is an act. Far from being the
stuff of rationality, thinking—no matter how logical or programmatic—
is paradoxically unconscious activity.'^"* It is for this reason that
Descartes was disastrously wrong when he hazarded the proposition, "I
think, therefore I am.'''^^ If we focus solely the result "I am," the "I"
has symbolic reality. It is a concept. It "is." But this I is radieally
ineommensurate with the I that thinks. This I is not. Hence, what
Descartes should have written is, "I think, therefore I am not,"!^^ or "I
am not where I think,"'^^ or "I do not think, therefore I am,
or
"either I think or I am,"'^^ or "I am, therefore it thinks,"'^ or "I think,
therefore an obscene, sadistic superego specter is watching me,""*i or
Freud's 'Wo es war, soil Ich werden."^"^^ Ironically, Descartes said the
one thing that cannot be sustained: "I think, therefore I am.
In spite of the paradox of the Cogito, the "thing that thinks"^'*''
always "posits" itself as existent—a negative (positing) unity wiA
infinite positive properties. The cogito cannot sustain itself in
negativity alone. It must return to the symbolic order if it is to be.
133 See FINK, supra note 1, atl06 (stating that thought itself isjouissance-Xaden)-, Zizek, supra
note 120, at 266 ("The conclusion to be drawn is thus ... that self-consciousness itself is radically
unconscious")-, 2LZEK, TICKLISH SUBJECT, supra note 24, at 97 (stating that knowledge is
performative).
134 Or as Zizek puts it; "[l]n order to be 'effective' at the ontic level, one must disregard the
ontological horizon of one's activity. (In this sense, Heidegger emphasizes that 'science doesn t
think' and that, far from being its limitation, this inability is the very motor of scientific
progress.)" ilZEK, TICKLISH SUBJECT, supra note 24, at 15. See also Stephen M. Feldman,
Playing with the Pieces: Postmodernism in the Lawyer's Toolbox, 85 VA. L. REV. 151, 179
(1999) ("Regardless of how postmodern a writer seeks to be, if she writes an essay or, for that
matter, communicates in any matter at all, then she must somehow domesticate
postmodernism.").
135 Rene Descartes, Meditation II: Of the Nature of the Human Mind, in THE MEDIATIONS
AND SELECTIONS FROM THE PRINCIPLES OF RENE DESCARTES (John Veitch trans., 1962) (1901).
136 See Jeanne L. Schroeder, Three's a Crowd: A Feminist Critique of Calabresi & Melamed's
One View of the Cathedral, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 394, 396 (1999).
137 See Dolar, supra note 18, at 28.
138 See ANDREW HAAS, HEGEL AND THE PROBLEM OF MULTIPLICITY 236 (2000) ("L negate,
therefore, 1 am.").
139 See Dolar, supra note 18, at 18; LACAN, supra note 4, at 211.
140 ZI2EK. TARRYING WITH THE NEGATIVE, supra note 41, at 59 (emphasis added).
According to Zizek, this is the masculine version of the cogito, which insists on self-presence and
relegates thinking to the unconscious. The feminine position chooses thought and therefore
vanishes to an empty point of apperception, as in the myth of Echo and Narcissus. See id.
141 ZI2EK. ENJOY YOUR SYMPTOM, supra note 92, at 127.
142 FINK, supra note 1, at 47 (translated as "where it was, there 1shall be").
143 The precise error of Descartes "consists in substantializing this empty spot of cogito by
turning it into res cogitans." Dolar, supra note 18, at 16.
144 See SCIENCE OF LOGIC, supra note 22, at 116 ("[B]y this T, or if you like, it (the thing)
that thinks, nothing further is represented than a transcendent suject of thoughts = x, which is
cognized only through the thoughts which are its predicates
").
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"What eventually remains, is a pure vanishing point without a
counterpart, which can only be sustained in a minimal gestme of
enunciation."^''^ In short, thinking ultimately depends on its product—
the thought, the signifier.'''®
This existent which the thinking subject must become is always
fully present to the acting subject (even as the non-acting subject stands
aloof from this all-encompassing present). In her act, the subject always
totalizes.''''' Suppose the thinking subject contemplates itself—the
symbolic "I" that "is." This I is not only present, but fully so. Yet,
while she contemplates her own self in its totality, the subject is not
truly self-conscious. The thinking self is not self-conscious when it acts
{i.e., thinks).This capacity for the unity of action and knowledge
(what Kant called an "intellectual intuition")'"^ was, according to
Augustine, lost for us when Eve ate the apple.Rather, the thing that
thi^s presupposes a totalized universe and an all-consuming presence,
but from this totality it has itself withdrawn.
Totalization is vital to the logic of "meaning." Meaning is the
precise, successful coincidence between signifler and signified.
Meaning is only successful in a thoroughly static symbolic order. By
way of an example, if I have a mental picture that 1 wish to
communicate, 1 must describe the picture completely in words. There
must be nothing left out. Nor must the words add anything to the
picture. 1 tell my vision to you. You understand my meaning when you
receive these words and the corresponding picture to which they refer
completely. There can be no room for slippage or surplus. This is what
"meaning" requires.
Anything less demotes meaning to mere
interpretation.'51
Yet a surplus is always there to betray meaning.'52 The surplus is
precisely the "1 think" who speaks the words that "are" and is hence
alienated from them. The attempt to "mean" is itself an act and must
always fail. The thing that thinks always stands over against her
totalizing activity. His words are never complete. Furthermore, words.
'45 Dolar, supra note 18, at 15.
'45 See id. at 19.
'41 On the totalizing nature of thinking, see FLAY, supra note 117, at 57, 137.
'48 See ZLZEK, TICKLISH SUBJECT, supra note 24, at 62 (noting that cogito is the subject of the
unconscious).
'49 CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON, supra note 9, at 163-64.
'50 See ZLZEK, PLAGUE OF FANTASIES, supra note 32, at 14-16.
'5' See LACAN, supra note 4, at 212 (interpretation reduces signifiers to their nonmeaning "so
as to find the determinants of the whole of the subject's behavior").
'52 See ZlZEK, TICKLISH SUBJECT, supra note 24, at 33, 106. Zizek portrays meaning as a
fantasy structure that papers over the suture of the Real so that the Real becomes a kind of screen
onto which meaningful "movies" can be projected. See ZlZEK, PLAGUE OF FANTASIES, supra
note 32, at 160 ("There is no meaning without some dark spot, without some
forbidden/impenetrable domain into which we project fantasies which guarantee our horizon of
meaning.").
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being public commodities, arc pret a porter—never tailor-made. They
never fit the subject. Hence, they bring extra content to the fore that
exceeds the subject.
PRAGMATISM

So far, cognitive thought has been revealed to be irrational,
impulsive, imthinking action.'" Descartes has been denounced for
inferring that, just because he thought, he perforce "existed." Surely
something must be wrong with this account. In particular, you may
think the following: the account may be adequate for "impulsive" acts,
but not for "deliberative" act. 1 have occasionally acted impulsively.
On such occasions, the meaning of the acts could only be retrieved after
the fact. And admittedly, if 1 truly act under the constraint of impulse,
the act's legality is a matter of good fortune or dumb luck. But, unlike
my impulsive acts, my deliberative acts have been rationally thought
out. Especially with regard to important decisions, such as changing
jobs or getting married, 1 have weighed the costs and benefits. 1 have
pondered hard and 1 have reached a decision. I acted according to this
decision. No doubt, my deliberated acts sometimes turn out badly. For
example, I was fired and got divorced. Nevertheless, at the time 1 acted,
1 acted from grounds of sufficient reason.
This account, based on the experience of deliberating and then
acting in accordance with pragmatic reason, must be interpreted as the
deceptive product of "self and vain conceit."'" What is portrayed as a
forward-looking reasoning process is in fact a retroactively created
narration no different from the process admitted with regard to the
impulsive act. Action is always impulsive and never deliberated.If
you think otherwise, then you deny the faet of the unconscious and
claim the possibility of an intellectual intuition.
153 See ZliEK, PLAGUE OF FANTASIES, supra note 32, at 223 (describing that the act occnrs as
a crazy, unaccountable event which is precisely not willed).
154 According to Shakespeare:
For within the hollow crown
That rounds the mortal temples of a king
Keeps Death his court, and there the antic sits
Scoffing at his state and grirming at his pomp.
Allowing him a breath, a scene or two.
To monarchise, be feared, and kill with looks.
Infusing him with self and vain conceit. . .
WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, RICHARD II act 3, § 2.
155 See FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, Beyond Good and Evil, in BASIC WRITINGS OF NIETZSCHE §
32 (Walter Kaufmann ed., 1968) ("The intention as the whole origin and pre-history of an
action—almost to the present day this prejudice dominated moral praise, blame, judgment, and
philosophy on earth.").
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The problem with pragmatic conceit is that, like strictly legal
discourse, it denies human freedom. According to the pragmatic
account, the deliberated act was not freely done. Rather, the subject
was "bound" by the reasons developed in advance of the act. If true,
this means that the act was not an act. Rather, it was just a mechanical,
unfree "repetition" of its ground. The act was not free at all but entirely
pathological, as Kant would say.'^^
At best, all that pragmatic reality achieves is to throw the true act
back to a point earlier in time. When a pragmatist contemplates what to
do and then does it in obedience to his earlier deliberations, no free
human being was responsible for this so-called act. Rather, the
"reasons" are to blame. The pragmatist who blames his reasons for his
act is simply trying to avoid responsibility—to win acquittal before the
superegoic court. But, as we have seen, the pragmatist's unseemly
whining and finger pointing at his so-called reasons can never win him
an acquittal. The pragmatist who pins the tail of blame on the donkey
of reason slanders his own freedom by such behavior. As Shakespeare
put it:
This is the excellent foppery of the world, that, when we are sick in
fortune,—often the surfeit of our own behaviour,—we make guilty

156 See CRITIQUE OF PRACTICAL REASON, supra note 37, at 48. Kant suggests that the very
existence of ethics depends on our finite natures—our inability to sustain an immediate relation to
God:
But instead of the conflict that the moral disposition has now to carry on with the
inclinations, . . . God and eternity . . . would stand unceasingly before our eyes . . . .
Transgression of the law, would, no doubt, be avoided. . . . but the mental disposition,
from which actions ought to proceed, carmot be infused by any command, and in this
case the spur of action is ever active and external, so that reason has no need to exert
itself in order to gather strength to resist the inclinations by a lively representation of
the dignity of the law: hence most of the actions that conformed to the law would be
done from fear, a few only from hope, and none at all from duty, and the moral worth
of actions ... would cease to exist. As long as the nature of man remains what it is, his
conduct would thus be changed into mere mechanism, in which, as in a puppet show,
everything would gesticulate well, but there would be no life in the figures. Now,
when it is quite otherwise with us, when with all the effort of our reason we have only
a very obscure and doubtful view into the future, when the Governor of the world
allows us only to conjecture His existence and His majesty, not to behold them or
prove them clearly;and, on the other hand, the moral law within us, without promising
or threatening anything with certainty, demands of us disinterested respect; and only
when this respect has become active and dominant does it allow us by means of it a
prospect into the world of the supersensible, and then only with weak glances; all this
being so, there is room for true moral disposition, immediately devoted to the law, and
a rational creature can become worthy of sharing in the summum bonum that
corresponds to the worth of his person and not merely to his actions. Thus what the
study of nature and of man teaches us sufficiently elsewhere may well be true here
also; that the tmsearchable wisdom by which we exist is not less worthy of admiration
in what it has denied than in what it has granted.
Id. at 175-76. See also ZI2EK, TICKLISH SUBJECT, supra note 24, at 325 (attributing the same
point to Malebranche).
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of our disasters the sun, the moon, and the stars

A pragmatist can no more blame her reasons for the act than the
treacher can blame the stars. The fault, however, is not in the stars.
In pragmatic philosophy, the act is not the product of reason.
Rather, the act occurs in the development of the reasons. The adoption
of reasons was the irrational, unconscious act. Having "acted" by
formulating reasons, the pragmatic subject surrenders her freedom to
these reasons, goes to sleep, as it were, and proceeds mechanically.
Reason therefore is made to take the blame.
Pragmatism, the illusion that we can follow our reasons, therefore
can be seen as a hatred of freedom and dread of responsibility. In short,
it is just another version of superegoic law. Like the superego, the
conceit of pragmatic intentionality presupposes the possibility that it can
fill the legal universe and know with certainty its own consequences.
In truth, whether the pragmatist likes it or not, the adoption of
reasons was an act, but following the reasons was yet another. As
Nietzsche put it:
everything about [action] that is intentional, everything about it that
can be seen, known, "conscious," still belongs to its surface and
skin—which, like every skin, betrays something but conceals even
more. In short... intention is merely a sign and symptom that still
requires interpretation. . .

Even upon careful deliberation, the subject was indeed free to ignore the
reasons developed earlier. Having deliberated, the subject can pause
and change her mind at any time. Indeed, given the fact that the
subject's act exceeds the prior symbolic order, the pragmatic act must
likewise exceed the prior reasons. The act is always overdetermined.
The pragmatist can never list all the reasons that truly caused the act.
From the above account, it should be clear that the myth of the
deliberative act presupposes a subject with no unconscious. Such a
subject supposes herself to be fully present, fully transparent to herself.
She is successfully self-identical. She knows why she acted. There is
no gap between the Real and the Symbolic, in such a subject.
Self-identity, however, is an impossible position. Subjectivity is
precisely the very failure of self-identity—it is distance from the
symbolic order and likewise distance from the Real. Hence, the myth of
the deliberative act—and of the self-identity of the subject—is what
157 WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, KING LEAR act 1, § 2.
158 In Shakespearean terms;
Nay, if we talk of reason.
Let's shut the gates and sleep: manhood and honour
Should have harehearts, would they but fat their thoughts
With this cramm'd reason.
WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, TROILUS AND CRESSIDA act 2, § 2.
159 NIETZSCHE, supra note 155, § 32.
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psychoanalysis calls a fantasy. If deliberation validly captures the
reality of the situation, there is no subject in the first place. The "thing
that thinks" is left out. We have only the poorer, passive, impotent half
of the Cogito.
In short, the subject is not licensed to warrant in advance that an
act is purely caused by deliberative reason. The act occurs for whatever
reason it occurs (not necessarily the reasons we put f o r t h ) . O u r
account of the matter is not necessarily its truth. Indeed, there is always
a surplus beyond the reasons stated, no matter how exhaustive the
reasoning process has been. The act is doomed to be traumatic. The act
becomes truly symbolized only after the fact.i®'
EFFECT AND CAUSE

Causation may be defined as necessary temporal sequencel^^
Supposedly, cause precedes effect. Yet, in the above account, the act
(effect) was first and its cause (as narrated) a distant second.
Yet cause can simultaneously precede effect,, thanks to the future
anterior grammar of performativity.'^^ The act was a performance an
unconscious act that presupposed a totalizing presence. Coeval and
synchronous to the act was the objet petit a—that which caused the act.
The narration excusing the act was likewise a performance. It gave
content to the objet petit a. But this does not mean that narration is
unstructured. Zizek puts it this way:
"[Pjerformativity" in no way designates the power of freely
160 ^ccorJRlCHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 149-50 (1990).
161 Thus, Zizek describes the noir philosopher Blaise Pascal as putting forth the proposition
that ideology always implies irrational obedience. The network of reasons masks the unbearable
fact that law is always "positive"—grounded only in its own act of enunciation. Argumentation
is for the crowd of ordinary people who need the illusion that there are good and proper reasons
for the orders they must obey. The true secret, known only to the elite, is that the dogma of
power is grounded only in itself. See ZI2EK, PLAGUE OF FANTASIES, supra note 32, at 175. See
also Zi2ek, Obscene Supplement, supra note 47, at 76:
[0]ne should reserve the Enlightenment notion according to which, to the ordinary
people unable to grasp the need for their religious belief, the truth of their religion has
to be asserted in an authoritarian way, as a dogma that needs no arguments, while the
enlightened elite is able to obey upon being convinced by good reasons
the
uncanny truth is rather that argumentation is for the crowd of "'ordinary people'" who
need the illusion that there are good and proper reasons for the order that they must
obey, while the true secret known only to the elites is that the dogma of power is
grounded only in itself. .. . Law is grounded only in its own act of enunciation.
Id. Zizek also suggests that reasons to do something are always at least minimally retroactively
posited by the act of decision they ground. Only once we decide to believe do reasons become
convincing to us, not vice versa. See ZLZEK, TICKLISH SUBJECT, supra note 24, at 19.
>62 CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON, supra note 9, at 93.
163 See JACQUES LACAN, ECRITS: A SELECTION 86 (Alan Sheridan trans., 1977) ("what 1 shall
have been for what I am in the process of becoming").
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"creating" the designated content ("words mean what we want them
to mean," etc.): the "quilting" [performativity] only structures the
material which is found, externally imposed. The act of naming is
"performative" only and precisely insofar as it is always-already part
of the definition of the signified content}^

In other words, narrative is not radically separate from what it describes.
Here at last we arrive at the conservative payoff of this essay. Legal
reasoning is always implicated in the judicial act. The former enjoys a
unity with the latter. Recall that the act was a real event, an
omnipresence. If the act was an omnipresence, then "reason" must have
been in the omnipresence. If reason had been excluded, we would have
before us less than an omnipresence.
In the act, the subject ''posits himself as his own cause ....
This is, incidentally, the secret message of the Coase theorem. Ronald
Coase's famous article. The Problem of Social Cost,'^^^ is usually cited
for the proposition that, in a world with no transaction costs (i.e., the
Lacanian Real), parties will bargain to reallocate legal entitlement
efficiently.
But another way of making the same point is that cause is
always "positive"—that is, a legal question. As such, effect always
precedes cause; cause can only be assigned after the fact in a
judgment.Hence, if there are any lingering doubts about the
conservative credentials of this article, it may be noted that retroactively
posited cause is precisely the point of the Coase Theorem and hence of
Law and Economics generally.
B\en though causal narrative (i.e., law) is retroactively performed,
it nevertheless captures something synchronous with the act. Narrative
may be post hoc, but it describes cause, which is coterminous with and
also precedes the act. In the narration, then, we have the past, present,
and future of the act.'^*^ In short, the narration totalizes the act. It
164 ZI^EK, TARRYING WITH THE NEGATIVE, supra note 41, at 150 (footnotes omitted).
165 ZIIEK, TICKLISH SUBJECT, supra note 24, at 375.
166 3 J. L. & ECON. 1 (1960).
, ,
,
^
167 Or more simply, in a universe that instantly corrects all legal errors, legal errors do not
matter. We are setting to one side the good point that no subjects exist at all in the Lacanian real.
168 In setting forth a parable about a man who builds a house with a chimney and a man who
builds a wall such that the smoke does not draw correctly from the chimney (filling the house
with smoke), Coase considers who is to "blame":
Tlie answer seems fairly clear. The smoke nuisance was caused both by the man who
built the wall andhy the man who lit the fires. Given the fires, there would have been
no smoke nuisance without the wall; given the wall, there would have been no smoke
nuisance without the fire. Eliminate the wall or the fire and the smoke nuisance would
disappear.
Id. at 13.
169 As Robert Cover saw:
.
...
The very imposition of a normative force upon a state of affairs, real or imagined, is
the act of creating narrative. The various genres of narrative—history, fiction, tragedy,
comedy—are alike in their being the account of states of affairs affected by a
normative force field. To live in a legal world requires that one know not only the
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renders the act visible in the symbolic order and also historicizes it, by
attributing diachrony to what is actually synchrony.
Narration
symbolizes the act—it is "recollection," or retrieval of repressed
material from the unconscious.'™ Narration retroactively separates out
cause which, in the narrative, precedes the act.
But narration is itself yet another act and therefore never
successful. The cause of action can never entirely be stated. Something
else is always left out of the pleading, which must always be dismissed
under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Superegoic Rules of Civil Procedure,
because meaning—a mere fantasy structure of totality—forever eludes
us. Superegoic law recognizes no cause of action. Demurrer is its only
procedure.'^'
Instead, action can only be interpreted. In this interpretation, the
action is made subject to a rule—a preexisting law.'^^ The free act is
fully symbolized and hence retroactively turns into the opposite of what
it was—unfree and subject to the rule of law.'
An interpretation might be wrong. But, on the other hand, it might
be right. How can we tell? Alas, whatever we decide is itself an
interpretation—of the interpretation. We can never know the past
directly. It becomes known to us as it is being transformed in an
interpretive performance. Hence the future anterior grammar of
interpretation. Interpretation always intervenes in—wades into and
pervades—the object. The object observed is not unaffected by the
observation. Yet only through the transformation of the object in
narration does it become visible to us. We are like the Tyrannosaurus
Rex. We can only see what moves. If a thing does not move, we are
unable to interpret it.'™ That which is not interpreted is simply
forgotten and truly becomes "the past." The past we actually know is
precepts, but also their connections to possible and plausible states of affairs. It
requires that one integrate not only the "is" and the "ought," but the "is," the "ought,"
and the "what might be." Narrative so integrates these domains. Narratives are models
through which we study and experience transformations that result when a given
simplified state of affairs is made to pass through the force field of a similarly
simplified set of norms.
Cover, supra note 100, at 10. From a Lacanian perspective, these sentiments are imprecise. A
state of affairs is never real but always imagined, and is not distinguishable from the narrative
itself. Furthermore, the "ought" refers to the "in-itself or potential of a thing. As such, it is in
the set of "what might be"—along with externally produced injustices upon the thing, or the
"ought not." Finally, the collision of simplified states would appear to be what Lacan would call
"trauma," but Cover is most vague on what he means. Nevertheless, he does seem to portray
narrative as an omnipresence in which past, present and future are united.
110 SEE HEGEL'S PHILOSOPHY OF MIND § 451 (William Wallace & A.V. Miller trans., 1971);
iliEK, ABYSS OF FREEDOM, supra note 26, at 37-38.
111 This is the point of Schroeder & Carlson, supra note 97.
172 CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON, supra note 9, at 71,134.
173 ZIZEK, ENJOYMENT AS A POLITICAL FACTOR, supra note 19, at 188.
174 Here 1 extrapolate from the movie version of Jurassic Park—the source of most of what
we know about the dinosaurs.
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always present.
These observations are by no means designed to condemn the
enterprise of finding correct legal answers. Quite the opposite should
be apparent. Meaning is always elusive but nevertheless "real."
Interpretation of an act becomes meaning when the interpreter erases
herself entirely in her act of interpretation.in Kantian terms, the
interpreter has a duty to interpret the object correctly. This requires,
however, the perfect moral autonomy of the interpreter. In the pose of
correct interpretation, the interpreter banishes all pathological criteria
which might distort the object interpreted. The non-pathological self
must let the thing speak for itself. It is the duty of the interpreter to
become the vanishing mediator who makes the object perfectly
transparent to the consumer of the interpretation. When the interpreter
perfectly performs the moral imperative incident to interpretation, we
have reached the realm of meaning.^'^^
Why is self-erasure necessary? Zizek suggests: "Because a
symbolic system has by definition the character of totality, there is
meaning only if everything has meaning."''^' In the realm of meaning,
there is no room for subjective caprice or freedom. Right answers are
possible only if human freedom erases itself. The very duty of the
interpreter is to efface herself entirely—so that superegoic law can
speak without distortion. In meaning, the subject finally comports with
what superegoic law demands.'''^
Attainment of meaning requires perfect self-transparency. Yet a
subject can never be sure she is perfectly transparent.''^ This point
makes meaning into an undecidable question.
But meaning is
nevertheless a moment with which we cannot dispense.'^" Meaning can
be glimpsed in the very structure of subjectivity. If the subject is the
gap between the Symbolic and the Real or between the moral and the
pathological, then Kantian autonomy is a constituent'^' element of the
'^5 See Schroeder, Midas Touch, supra note 128, at 762 ("This temporary quilting of
signification into meaning, which requires a willful forgetting of the shifting contingency of
signification, is necessary for speech.").
176 Cf. IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDWORK OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 13-14 (Mary
Gregor trans., 1998) ("Now, an action from duty is to put aside entirely the influence of
inclination and with it every object of the will; hence there is left from the will nothing that could
determine it except... the law. ...").
177 ZI2EK. ENJOYMENT AS A POLITICAL FACTOR, supra note 19, at 215.
178 This is with the proviso that the superego demands contradictory things. It says both
"erase yourself and "enjoy yourself."
179 See ZIZEK, TICKLISH SUBJECT, supra note 24, at 365 ("[W]e never know if the determinate
content that accounts for the specificity of our acts is the right one, that is, if we have actually
acted in accordance with the Law and have not been guided by some hidden pathological
motives.").
180 See Cover, supra note 100, at 15 ("The unification of meaning that stands at its center
exists only for an instant, and that instant is itself imaginary.").
•81 "Constitution" is a swear word in Kantian philosophy. I use it here nevertheless, but 1
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self. It is one of the poles between which the tent of self is pitched.
One cannot be suspended between the poles if the poles do not exist.
Meaning is simply the exaltation of the autonomy pole at the total
expense of the pathological pole.
Meaning emerges when the
interpreter exorcises the pathological and allows only the nonpathological, "autonomous" side to speak. When this occurs, signifier
coincides with signified. The signifier thus becomes a sign
i.e., a
successful correlation.'^^
Meaning is achieved at the precise moment the subject interprets.
Interpretation is a Real act. At this moment, the subject is unconscious.
The polar opposites between which the subject resides have collapsed.
The subject contracts infinitely, and the symbolic order expands
accordingly:
The Word is a contraction in the guise of its very opposite, of an
expansion-, that is, in pronouncing a word, the subject contracts his
being outside himself, he "coagulates" the core of his being in an
external sign. In the (verbal) sign I find myself outside myself. . . .
In this oracular moment, when the subject goes blank, interpretation
becomes meaning. Alas, it is only a moment a glimpse, ajouissance.
The aet of interpretation is a traumatic event beyond the symbolic realm
which, in the end, cannot bear the phenomenon of "meaning."
The unity that acts—^which pole is it? Do we have corrupt,
pathological interpretation, driven by selfish concerns? Or do we have
an aphanisis—the genuine vanishing mediator that allows the thing to
speak for
jhis we must always interpret for ourselves. The
key point is: interpretation rightly claims a ground of reason. Reason
can never be entirely purged by pathology. But, likewise, the obverse is
true: reason can never entirely purge
It is this last point that justifies this Article's conservative
credentials. Because meaning is "necessary," the rule of law is
vindicated from the assault by the romantic Utopian left. Granted, we
never know completely whether the interpretation is the object s true
meaning. But at least we know that the interpretation logically captures
itself?

pathology.

believe that the moral side of personality helps to "constitute" the subject. Yet because we can
never experience this side directly, we can only postulate its existence. This postulation therefore
"regulates" our empirical inquiry into the constitution of the subject. See CRITIQUE OF PURE
REASON, supra note 9, at 287-88.
182 On sign versus signifier, see KATHLEEN DOW MAGNUS, HEGEL AND THE SYMBOLIC

MEDIATION OF SPIRIT 13-52 (2001).
183 ZIIVK, ABYSS OF FREEDOM, supra note 26, at 38.
184 See LAGAN, supra note 4, at 210; ZI2EK, PLAGUE OF FANTASIES, supra note 32, at 175
(defining aphanisis as the self-erasure of the subject when she approaches her fantasy too
closely).
,
185 See KANT, supra note 176, at 19 ("[W]e can never, even by the most stenuous seltexamination, get entirely behind our covert incentives . . . ."); id. at 56 ("[Tjhe human being
cannot claim to cognize what he is in himself through the cognizance he has by inner sensation. ).
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something from the object—some part of its meaning.
To summarize our findings of fact about the cause of action, the
cause can only be pleaded (symbolized) after the act. There must be a
case or controversy before we are admitted to the court of the big Other.
What we, in our narrative mode, describe as cause is actually a
performance. We are not merely describing the cause but also creating
it as we describe it. The real substance of the cause we describe in our
narrative is a non-Thing—the objetpetit
It is the thing that would
render us whole. The subject of desire acts in pursuit of wholeness,
which it glimpses in every act. Hence, the act is caused by the objet
petit a. The act never entirely precedes cause. Indeed, cause is just as
much in the Real as is its effect. They "coincide" in the real and are
therefore synchronous. Only retroactively do we distinguish between
cause and effect, separating them temporally. Hence, cause is the act
itself. Yet every attempt to articulate the cause is itself an effect, whose
cause must be narrated. This is the chain of cause-and-effect—the third
of Kant's four antinomies.'^'' The chain exists only in the symbolic
order. As such, each cause and effect must be plucked from the realm
of the Real and must be given body in words. Shakespeare, as always,
puts it nicely:
Lovers and madmen have such seething brains.
Such shaping fantasies, that apprehend
More than cool reason ever comprehends.
The lunatic, the lover, and the poet
Are of imagination all compact:—
The poet's eye, in a fine frenzy rolling.
Doth glance from heaven and earth, from earth to heaven
And, as imagination bodies forth
The forms of things unknown, the poet's pen
Turns them to shapes, and gives to airy nothing
A local habitation and a name.
Such tricks hath strong imagination.
That, if it would but apprehend some joy.
It comprehends some bringer of that joy;
Or in the night, imagining some fear.
How easy is a bush supposed a bear!
Interpreters of acts are truly madmen with seething brains who
apprehend more than cool reason can comprehend. Causes and reasons

' 86 See ZIZEK, TARRYING WITH THE NEGATIVE, supra note 41, at 31.
'87 CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON, supra note 9, at 253-56 (stating either every cause is itself
caused or the chain of causes is caused by an uncaused free thing).
'88 WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, A MIDSUMMERNIGHT'S DREAM act 5, § I.
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are the product of poets' pens, who give names to airy nothing.They
"comprehend" their earlier enjoyment and therefore apprehend that
"bringer"—retroactively posited cause.
Yet the poet's words never "signify." The place of the signified
can only be filled with other signifiers, dooming us to a never-ending
chain of cause-and-effect. A cosmological'^' move is needed to totalize
the chain. Cosmological solutions exceed the realm of reason, Kant
teaches.'^2 xhis "uncaused" thing is precisely the "totalizing" human
subject in her freedom.
I'f.

I

LEGAL OPINION

!
i

We are now in a position to complete our thesis quickly and
efficiently. In law, a judge "acts" and then writes an opinion after the
fact. The act is unthinking. The judicial opinion is a narration of the
act. In the judicial decision, we learn that pre-existing law caused the
judicial act.
In this pose, the judge is an oracle. She goes blank and acts. In the
real, where the act resides, the act has a synchronous unity with its
cause. At this moment, the judge has erased her subjectivity. Her act is
legal precisely because she renounced her freedom and simply repeated
what law demands. Nothing original inheres in the judicial act. The
judge has had what Kant would call an "intellectual intution."'^^
Upon awaking from her trance, the judge in her judicial opinion

ii.'
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i

•
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n:!?:

;
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9 cf. FINK, supra note 1, at 41 ("a signifier marks the cancellation of what it signifies"),
190 On the distinction between the madman's apprehension and the subsequent comprehensive
narrative, Ziiek suggests that comprehension is retained apprehension over time.
[T]ime itself and the transcendental imagination in its synthetic activity of autoaffection are not directly the same, since [transcendental imagination] already exerts a
violence on the pure temporal dispersal—without this violence, reality itself would not
retain its minimal ontological consistency. Transcendental schematism thus designates
the procedure by which, already at the level of pre-discursive, purely intuitive temporal
experience, the pure pre-synthetic temporal dispersal is violently subordinated to the
synthetic activity of the subject, whose defmitive form is the application of the
discursive categories of Understanding to intuition. Schematism forges our temporal
experience into a homogeneous linear succession in which past and future are
subordinated to the present (which retains the past and announces the future): what
transcendental schematism prevents us from thinking is precisely the paradox of
creatio ex nihilo.
ZI^EK, TICKLISH SUBJECT, supra note 24, at 43.
191 A cosmological solution is a principle of totality of a series of conditions or properties, as
existing in itself and given in an object. See CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON, supra note 9, at 231,
288.

192 See id. at 238 (stating cosmological ideas are directed solely to the unconditioned among
phenomena); id. at 288 (maintaining cosmological propositions said to be "constitutive"); id. at
300 (asserting cosmological freedom is not subordinated to another cause determining it in time).
193 CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON, supra note 9, at 163-64.
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explains the mystery of her act to us. In this opinion can be found the
past, present, and foture of law. (1) Law preceded the act. For this
reason, the judge's opinion is objectively correct. (2) Law was present
in the act. The judge acted as transparent vanishing mediator of the law.
Through the judge, it was the law, not the judge, who acted. (3) Law
arrives too late—after the act. The judge described the act in her afterthe-fact narrative of what happened. By then, law has vanished,
shattered by the trauma of judicial decision.
In writing her opinion, the judge armounces that her decision was
caused by the law. But this is only half-true. Judicial decision is
traumatic. It disrupts the prior law. The subsequent judicial opinion
ostensibly "reports" the cause of action, but it actually always
reconstitutes it.'®'* Instead of simply applying a universal rule in a
unique concrete situation, the judge re-invents the universal rule in light
of each unique concrete situation.
The need to reconstitute the symbolic order after the trauma of a
judicial decision is the inescapable truth of jurisprudence. A judicial act
always exceeds the superegoic law and, therefore, must always be
reversed on appeal. The judicial opinion, however, attempts to legislate
away grounds for appeal by reconstituting the operative law in order to
create the appearance that the judicial act accorded with the law.
This attempt to evade appeal by rewriting the law after the fact
must always fail. If the losing side appeals, the appellate division of the
superegoic court is bound to find that the judge has "acted"—i.e.,
disrupted the pre-existing symbolic order. Needless to say, superegoic
appellate procedure has but one result: "reversed!" Nor does the appeal
end the matter. The judicial acts of both the trial comt and the appellate
panel are both constantly and repetitively appealed "as of right"'®^ to the
Supreme Court of the big Other. The common law process at work in
the big Other ultimately explains (symbolizes) the prior actions. The
symbolic order is constantly reworked to account for and to legalize (or
perhaps condemn) the earlier judicial acts.'®^
Against this background, it is possible to understand precisely what
justice is. Justice is the missing part whose absence makes us feel
castrated. It is the objet petit a. As such it is entirely negative. True,
'9" See ZIZEK, ENJOYMENT AS A POLITICAL FACTOR, supra note 19, at 215.
"5 See ZI2EK, TICKLISH SUBJECT, supra note 24, at 365.
196 See N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5301 (2002). In the court of the big Other, appeals always involve
constitutional questions and are therefore "as of right" and never merely "by permission." N.Y.
C.P.L.R. 5302.
191 For this reason, Pierre Schlag is wrong in his excoriations of legal scholarship as useless,
"pretend" law. See. e.g., PIERRE SCHLAG, LAYING DOWN THE LAW: MYSTICISM, FETISHISM,
AND THE AMERICAN LEGAL MIND 138 (1996). Judges are not "in charge" of the common law.
Culture is. To be sure, judges are especially efficacious in shaping its content, but legal scholars
participate as well. Surely, many examples could be found in which the pressure of public
opinion has led to changes in the common law.
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we turn the wrongs against us to shapes, and give to airy justice a local
habitation and a name. But these embodied examples of justice always
exceed and therefore fail to capture the object of justice. No legal
victory would make us whole. Castration is our fate. Justice is
impossible to achieve.
This is the lesson Portia tries to teach Shylock in The Merchant of
Venice. Shylock demands justice from the "strict court of Venice," but
the court refuses to give it. It renders only twice blessed mercy. Its
mode of doing so is by reformulating the symbolic order, so that, if
Shylock may feed his revenge with a pound of flesh, he may not shed a
drop of blood in obtaining it. This "surprise" content of the law is
revealed only retroactively to redeem Antonio from superegoic law,
before which he was obviously guilty.
Because justice is not a positive thing but the mere absence of the
Thing, justice is quite opaque to general definition. Any definition of
justice occurs only by use of signifiers, yet justice is quite is beyond
signification. So conceived, justice must always fail.'®^ As Renata
Salecl puts it:
In terms of Lacanian psychoanalysis, the difference between law
and justice is that between symbolic knowledge and act as Real.
Justice is a decision, an act of judgement, which cannot be wholly
founded in law. The judge must rest his judgement on the
knowledge of law, yet the act of just decision is never a result of a
simple application of the law—there is always a moment of
singularity and contingency which clings to the act. The gap
separating justice from law is thus unbridgeable: justice is done with
reference to the domain of law, yet in its exercise it transgresses it.^oo

In this account, justice is unspeakable and quite beyond any known
legal precinct—even a transgression against law. The only justice the
law permits is the purely negative form of it. Any attempt to provide
content to the name "justice" is strictly prohibited. One might say that
law prohibits justice in its impossibility. Justice is in the quantum state
between the symbolic concepts of right and wrong. It can never be
quite captured by or reduced to legal concepts. Justice can exist only in
the lawless interstices between these concepts.
The internal gaps within communication—Derridean archewriting—^prevent language from being a closed system. Meaning

See ZI2EK, TICKLISH SUBJECT, supra note 24, at 233 ("[T]he moment a political movement
pretends fiilly to realize Justice, to translate it into an actual state of things, to pass from the
spectral democratie a venir to 'actual democracy,' we are in totalitarian catastrophe—in Kantian
terms, the Sublime changes into the Monstrous.").
199 See Derrida, supra note 99, at 24-29; Stephen M. Feldman, TTie Politics of Postmodern
Jurisprudence, 95 MICH. L. REV. 166, 195 (1996); Schroeder, Eumenides, supra note 89; ZLZEK,
METASTASES OF ENJOYMENT, supra note 72, at 196-97.
290 SALECL, supra note 132, at 91.
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implies a closed system, yet, in a closed system, all meaning,
paradoxically, would disappear. According to Zizek:
What circulates between subjects in symbolic communication is of
course ultimately the lack, absence itself, and it is this absence that
opens the space for "positive" meaning to constitute itself. But all
these are paradoxes immanent to the field of communication qua
meaning: the very signifier of nonsense, the "signifier without
signified," is the condition of the possibility of the meaning of all the
other signifiers, i.e., we must never forget that the "nonsense" with
which we are here concemed is strictly intemal to the field of
meaning, that it "tmncates" it from within.^oi

In this sense, the Real is the limit within Law itself that prevents law
from abolishing (or achieving) justice. Justice, as this void, participates
the "ethics of the Real," which is
the moral Law in its impenetrable aspect, as an agency that arouses
anxiety by addressing me with the empty, tautological and, for that
very reason, enigmatic injunction "Do your duty!", leaving it to me
to translate this injunction into a determinate moral obligation—I,
the moral subject, remain forever plagued by uncertainty, since the
moral Law provides no guarantee that I "got it right". . .

This gap "between knowledge and decision, between the chain of
reasons and the act which resolves the dilemma," is the "ultimate
deadlock" of modem times.^o^ This gap implies that doing justice is
always an act of "sublimation:"—in sublimation, the judge elevates a
(non)-object to the dignity of the Thing.
The judge always practices the "ethics of the Real," and this means
there is something paradoxical about the act of judging. The judge
erases herself so that law can speak through her without subjective
distortion. In erasure, the judge submits to law. But law likewise
requires subjectivity in general. Otherwise, law can never appear, and
can never condemn anything. Therefore, self-erasure is impossible and.
201 ZI2EK, LOOKING AWRY, supra note 30, at 131-32 (footnotes omitted).
202 ZI2EK, INDIVISIBLE REMAINDER, supra note 30, at 168-69. See CRITIQUE OF PURE
REASON, supra note 9, at 310:
The real morality of actions—their merit or demerit, and even that of our own conduct,
is completely unknown to us. Our estimates can relate only to their empirical
character. How much is the result of the action of free-will, how much is to be
ascribed to nature and to blameless error, or to a happy constitution of temperament...
no one can discover, nor, for this reason, determine with perfect justice.
Id. See also ZIZEK, TARRYING WITH THE NEGATIVE, supra note 41, at 70 (describing how the
Kantian subject is "forever tortured by the possibility that his ethical act, although in accordance
with duty, was not accomplished for the sake of duty itself.. ."); ZIZEK, PLAGUE OF FANTASIES,
supra note 32, at 221 (stating that the ethical subject is the only guarantor of the universality of
positive moral norms). "Anxiety" is defined as getting too close to the Real. See ZLZEK,
LOOKING AWRY, supra note 30, at 8, 146. Hence, any call of the moral is by definition ridden
with anxiety.
203 ZIZEK, TICKLISH SUBJECT, supra note 24, at 337.
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furthermore, prohibited. It is beyond law. Yet it is covertly required.
Furthermore, when the judge acts, the erasure is paradoxical. The
erased will of the judge is not erased but has positive (extra-legal)
content. Here we have the crucial Hegelian point that the erased
nothing is, after all, something.^o^ This extra-legal excess of selferasure is the "Freudian death drive," and it describes the ultimate moral
act.205 In the moral act, the symbolic order is suspended and the judge
is on her own. Hence, morality is strictly illegal. Yet it is only through
the judge's moral illegality that law can ever appear in its undistorted
form.
The judge's dilemma is this. She knows there is a law. But she
never knows what the law is. A gap separates the law fi-om its positive
incarnations. The judge is thus a priori, in her very existence, guilty:
guilty without knowing what she is guilty of, infringing the law without
knowing its exact regulations.^o^ A judge who acts cannot blame the
law as her reason but must take total responsibility for what she does.^®''
This is law's traumatic dimension.
GRAPHING LEGAL REASON

Before concluding, I would like to borrow from one of Lacan's
graphic illustrations of the retroactivity of interpretation.^"^

204 See SCIENCE OF LOGIC, supra note 22, at 119:
Something preserves itself in the negative of its determinate being [Nichtdasein]-, it is
essentially one with it and essentially not one with it. It stands ... in a relation to its
otherness .... The otherness is at once contained in it and also still separate from it; it
is being-for-other.
See id. at 102 (asserting "but a negative nothing is an affirmative something").
205 ZI2EK, TICKLISH SUBJECT, supra note 24, at 263. See generally Schroeder & Carlson,
supra note 61.
206 See ZI2EK, TICKLISH SUBJECT, supra note 24, at 265; COPJEC, READ MY DESIRE, supra
note 5, at xv ("Guilt, our sure sense that we have transgressed the law, is the only phenomenal
form in which the law makes itself known to us.").
207 Robert Cover reaches a like conclusion but on much different grounds. For Cover, there is
no one law. There are many laws. When the judge asserts American positive law, the judge must
take responsibility. Nevertheless, when the judge is within the cormmmity of the litigants. Cover
implies that the judge can claim to be following the law, contrary to what has been said here. See
Robert M. Cover, Violence and the Word, 95 YALE L.J. 1601 (1986).
208 This graph is described in Mladen Dolar, The Object Voice, in SIC 1: GAZE AND VOICE AS
LOVE OBJECTS 7 (Renata Salecl & Slavoj ZiJek eds. 1996); 2I2EK, SUBLIME OBJECT, supra note
27, at 101-29.
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In this graph, time flows from left to right, but legal reasoning
proceeds backward. We start with the judge who "acts" by deciding.
The judicial act proceeds upward and encounters the big Other (A).
This node is a totality, representing the fact that, in the act, the judge is
oblivious and unconscious as she stands over against the correlative
law. The judge has erased herself and, in her transparency, encounters
the realm of right answers.
From this first node, the judge proceeds backwards to the bottom
left node—the node of the signified (s(A)). What this represents is a
traversing of the symbolic order. In effect, the judge, in her trance
listens to legal argument from the litigants. What hits the judge is a
stream of syllables—nonsensical syllables, until the argument is
finished. When finished, the judge "understands" the argument. What
seemed at the start of the argument as nonsense syllables now
retroactively makes sense. The syllables were simply parts of a
sentence that made no sense until the sentence was completed. Once
completed, the syllables retroactively "signified" some legal object.
Because a "signified" can exist only in a correlative universe, and
because correlation is the hallmark of fantasy, we can say that
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signification is dominated by the fantasy of right answers.^^^
Having now understood the argument, the judge, in her erasure,
produces the right answer in her judicial opinion. This is how legal
reasoning works at the Dworkinian level—the level at which judges do
not suffer from the distortions of the unconscious.
But psychoanalysis adds an "illocutionary" aspect to judging,
which is shown in the upper half of the graph. At the bottom right node,
the judge, in her erasure, proceeds to the bottom left node of s(A). But,
instead of proceeding from A to s(A), the judge's retroactive reasoning
process is portrayed as a Lacanian act. Entering the realm of
illocutionary force, the judge's act proceeds to the third node of drive
(3<>Z)). The 3 oxavba for the Lacanian split subject. This is the
subject who knows she is castrated and can never be whole.
Nevertheless, she strives for wholeness anyway. She "acts," knowing
the act will be futile. This is the subject caught up in the death drive.
Driven to judge, she proceeds retroactively to the upper right node
of s(%)—^the "barred Autre." It is here that the thrust of this essay can
be loeated. In effect, the judge is driven to act. In the jouissance of
acting, the symbolic order is obliterated, producing the barred Autre or
Other. The barred Other on the upper left is the truth of the bottom left
node of the signified. In it, we see that the big Other (like the subject) is
organized around a kernel of the Real which can never be symbolized—
a trauma.210 Hence, while the judge produces "right answers" in the
lower half of the graph, the judge obliterates the very possibility of right
answers in the unconscious upper portion of the graph.
Not only does the judge's jouissance disrupt the big Other, but the
big Other likewise disrupts the judge's jouissance. Jouissance does not
pass through the symbolic order unaffected. The act is a failure. It ends
with castration. The judge in her act has not succeeded in capturing
justice {object petit a). Nevertheless, at the end of the process we have
a judicial opinion that purports to be the law but appears so only in a
retroactive process that secretly rewrites the law. It is the judge who, in
her act, made up the first node (the big Other). This big Other is
reconstituted in the very aet of the judge.
CONCLUSION

The difficulty that American jurisprudence cannot solve is that law
and liberty are ostensibly at war.^n In Shakespearean terms, "Liberty
209 See ZLZEK, SUBLIME OBJECT, supra note 27, at 123.
210 See id. at 122.
211 As Pierre Schlag emphasizes. See PIERRE SCHLAG, THE ENCHANTMENT OF REASON 11,
138 (1998).
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plucks justice by the nose."^'^ In psychoanalytic theory, they are
reconciled. With every free act, the law is traumatized. After-the-fact
narration solves the trauma and changes the law. Because the law is
dynamic and is the product of interpretation, the subject is both free and
ruled by law. Law is not brittle but, like a reed, bends with the wind.
But this is so only when law is spoken in the future anterior tense. As
such, it is the solution to the traumatic dimension in law.

212 WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, MEASURE FOR MEASURE act 1, § 3.

